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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Survey discusses major Florida evidentiary case law 
developments during the 2014 calendar year.1  As in most years since the 
Florida Evidence Code’s (“the Code”) passage, few significant statutory 
changes occurred in 2014.2  Florida attorneys must continue to look to the 
state’s appellate courts for guidance on the Code and other evidentiary 
related issues.*  As with most survey years, not every recent decision merits 
discussion.*  Cases have been selected for discussion in this Survey on the 
basis of three criteria:  (1) the case represents a new or relatively new 
evidentiary development, (2) the case provides a good example of 
fundamental principles in a certain area, or (3) evidentiary issues in a 
particular area arose so commonly, that they are important for discussion to 
both practitioners and the courts.3  As a service to readers, the author notes 
that the following evidentiary areas, not discussed in the Survey’s main text, 
generated opinions during 2014:4  judicial notice,5 accident report privilege,6 
                                                 
*  J.D., 1973, Catholic University; L.L.M., 1977, Temple University.  M. 
Dobson is a member of the Florida Bar and is also admitted to practice in Kansas.  He is a 
professor of law at Nova Southeastern University. 
1. See infra Parts II–VII. 
2. In 2014, the Florida Legislature made four changes to the Code.  See Act 
effective Oct. 1, 2014, ch. 2014-160, § 15, 2014 Fla. Laws 2157, 2190–91; Act effective Oct. 
1, 2014, ch. 2014-200, § 1, 2014 Fla. Laws 2632, 2633; Act effective May 12, 2014, ch. 2014-
19, § 30, 2014 Fla. Laws 299, 325; Act effective May 12, 2014, ch. 2014-35, § 2, 2014 Fla. 
Laws 676, 678.  Three of these were extremely minor.  Chapter 2014-160, Florida Laws, 
amended section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes, by changing statutory references in 
subsections (2)(b)(2) and (c)(2).  See FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (2014).  Chapter 2014-19, Florida 
Laws, deleted obsolete provisions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in section 90.503 of 
the Florida Statutes.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.503.  Finally, chapter 2014-200, Florida Laws, made 
minor changes and deletions to the hearsay exception for statements of elderly persons or 
disabled adults in section 90.803(24) of the Florida Statutes.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.803.  The 
only significant statutory change was made in section 90.204 of the Florida Statutes 
concerning the propriety and nature of taking judicial notice.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.204.  
Chapter 2014-35, Florida Laws, added a fourth subsection to this rule, providing for the 
emergency taking of judicial notice in family law cases.  See id. § 90.204(4). 
3. See infra Parts II–VII. 
4. See infra Parts II–VII.  The author does not claim this footnoted list is a 
complete catalogue of all evidentiary issues discussed in the 2014 decisions.  For example, 
neither the Survey’s main text nor this list includes cases discussing expert testimony. 
5. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.201–.204.  When judicial notice is taken of 
information not offered in open court, fairness requires the parties to be given a chance to 
challenge it and to offer contradictory proof.  Id.  In Glaister v. Glaister, the court found a 
general master in a domestic relations case erred sua sponte by taking judicial notice of an IRS 
tax guide without affording a challenge opportunity as required by section 90.204(3) of the 
Florida Statutes.  Glaister v. Glaister, 137 So. 3d 513, 516–17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); 
see also FLA. STAT. § 90.204(3).  
2
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informer privilege, 7  litigation privilege, 8  trade secrets, 9  impeachment on 
collateral matters,10 impeachment by showing potential bias,11 impeachment 
                                                                                                                   
As mentioned above in note 1, the 2014 Florida Legislature added a fourth 
subsection to section 90.204 of the Florida Statutes, providing for the emergency taking of 
judicial notice in family law cases when imminent danger to persons or property exists.  Ch. 
2014-35, § 2, 2014 Fla. Laws at 678 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.204(4)); see also supra note 
1 and accompanying text. 
6. See FLA. STAT. § 316.066(4).  In Wetherington v. State, the defendant’s 
felony driving under the influence conviction was reversed because the trial court erroneously 
allowed the investigating police officer to testify to statements Wetherington made identifying 
himself as the driver of a crashed vehicle in a one car accident.  Wetherington v. State, 135 
So. 3d 584, 585, 587 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  These statements were made before either 
the defendant waived his Miranda rights or otherwise waived his privilege against self-
incrimination.  Id. at 586 n.1.  This violated the accident report privilege.  Id. at 586; see also 
FLA. STAT. § 316.066. 
7. See State v. Powell, 140 So. 3d 1126, 1127, 1130 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (arising from the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari requesting reversal of a trial 
court’s order to disclose the identity of confidential informants who provided police 
information used in an application for a wiretap).  The State’s general privilege in withholding 
a confidential informant’s identity can only be overcome if either the informant will be a 
witness at trial or if disclosing the informant’s identity is essential to a fair determination of 
the case.  Id.  As the only purpose of disclosure was to provide information to contest probable 
cause for issuance of the wiretap application, identity disclosure was not constitutionally 
required.  Id. at 1132. 
For a recent short article discussing the informer’s privilege, see Stephen A. 
Saltzburg, Trial Tactics:  Informant Privilege, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2015, at 60. 
8. See Pomfret v. Atkinson, 137 So. 3d 1161, 1162–64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014).  Although there is no absolute privilege for an attorney’s alleged defamatory 
statements during ex-parte, out-of-court statements to a potential, non-party witness, such 
statements may be protected by a qualified privilege.  Id.  When the statements have some 
relation to an underlying lawsuit, the party alleging defamation must show express malice.  Id. 
at 1164.  Express malice means that the statements were made with a desire to harm the 
person allegedly defamed.  Id.; R.H. Ciccone Props., Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
141 So. 3d 590, 591–92 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (specifying that the litigation privilege 
did not support the trial court’s order dismissing appellant’s quiet title action against a bank 
after the bank voluntarily dismissed its foreclosure action against the appellant). 
9. See FLA. STAT. § 90.506 (generally protecting trade secrets as privileged, 
as long as recognizing the “privilege will not conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice”).  
This section does not define what is a trade secret, leaving this instead to section 688.002 of 
the Florida Statutes.  FLA. STAT. § 688.002(4).  When information is claimed to be a trade 
secret, the court must first decide if it qualifies as such, and then hold a hearing on its 
disclosure, and on how it is necessary to determine the underlying issues in the litigation.  See 
Bright House Networks, LLC v. Cassidy, 129 So. 3d 501, 505–06 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (finding that customer lists not publicly available can be trade secrets, thus requiring an 
in camera review to determine such, and to also determine the opposing party’s need to access 
them for the litigation). 
For another recent case involving disclosure of trade secrets, see Laser Spring Inst., 
LLC v. Greer, 144 So. 3d 633, 633–34 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), finding that billing and 
3
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with prior inconsistent statements, 12  the rape shield statute, 13  the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,14 authentication of photographs taken 
                                                                                                                   
collection documents which admittedly were trade secrets could not be ordered disclosed 
without a hearing making particularized findings for their need. 
10. See FLA. STAT. § 90.608(5) (permitting “[p]roof by other witnesses that 
material facts are not as testified to by [a] witness”).  This language forbids impeachment by 
offering contradictory proof on purely collateral matters, introduced only to contradict the 
witness’s testimony on a minor point.  See id.  What is collateral or not must necessarily be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.  See Anderson v. State, 133 So. 3d 646, 647–48 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1006 (2015) (finding that whether a sexual 
battery victim wore jogging clothes or pajamas at the time of the alleged attack was collateral, 
even if the victim’s characterization of her dress as jogging clothes was false); Cokely v. 
State, 138 So. 3d 1204, 1208–09 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that the witness’s 
proffered testimony would not have been collateral, as it would have contradicted the victim’s 
direct examination testimony related to the material contested issue of whether the victim had 
been trespassing on the defendant’s property before the defendant allegedly attacked the 
victim). 
One area where the Florida courts have held as a matter of law that proof will never 
be considered collateral is where it demonstrates potential bias.  Id. 
11. See Brown v. Mittelman, 152 So. 3d 602, 604–05 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (finding that the financial relationship between a treating doctor and a referring 
plaintiff’s law firm is discoverable as potential bias evidence in a negligence case). 
12. See Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 377–79 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 1406 (2015) (finding that the trial court only harmlessly erred in sustaining objection to 
the attempted impeachment of a witness by using another person’s statement). 
13. FLA. STAT. § 794.022.  This section, commonly known as the Rape Shield 
Statute, although not part of the Code, is clearly meant to regulate proof in some criminal 
cases.  See id.; Cooper v. State, 137 So. 3d 530, 531 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  While the 
section forbids the introduction of a victim’s prior sexual acts with persons other than the 
defendant, by its explicit terms, it does so only in sexual battery prosecution cases under 
section 794.011 of the Florida Statutes.  FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2).  Thus, when such acts are 
asked about in cases not being brought under this chapter, section 794.022 of the Florida 
Statues does not forbid the inquiry, despite a charge’s sexually related nature.  Id. § 794.022; 
see also Cooper, 137 So. 3d at 531 (arguing that where the state confessed on appeal that 
section 794.022 of the Florida Statutes should not have prohibited cross-examination of a 
victim about her prior sexual experiences in a lewd and lascivious molestation and battery 
case).  Despite this confession of error, the Fourth District Court of Appeal declined to reverse 
because the defense had not argued the section’s inapplicability at trial when the State 
objected to the defense’s inquiry.  Cooper, 137 So. 3d at 531–32.  Furthermore, the defense 
had not proffered what the defense’s questions would have revealed.  Id. at 531 n.1.  The 
Fourth District summarily rejected the argument that excluding the potential testimony was 
fundamental error.  Id. at 531. 
The result in Cooper illustrates the requirements that are ignored all too often by 
trial counsel.  See id.  The contemporaneous objection rule requires that counsel object 
promptly, precisely, and correctly when seeking to exclude evidence.  FLA. STAT. § 90.104.  
On the other side, when an objection is made, the attorney wishing to introduce certain 
information must correctly explain to the trial court why the objection should be overruled.  
See id.  If the objection is sustained, the proponent of the information must make an adequate 
offer of proof to preserve the issue for appeal.  See id.  Failure to satisfy any of these 
4
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from videotapes,15 sequestration of witnesses,16 lay opinion testimony,17 and 
various hearsay rule issues.18 
                                                                                                                   
requirements will almost always lead to an appellate court declining to address an evidentiary 
issue.  E.g., McGee v. State, 19 So. 3d 1074, 1078–79 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).  As 
Cooper also shows, fundamental error arguments are often given short shrift and rarely lead to 
reversals.  See 137 So. 3d at 531–32.  Furthermore, the defense had not proffered what its 
questions would have revealed.  See id. at 531 n.1. 
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (applied to the states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400 (1965)).  The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees an accused the right 
“to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  Id. 
Several cases during this Survey period briefly discussed the scope of this clause’s 
protection.  E.g., McKenzie v. State, 153 So. 3d 867, 879 (Fla. 2014).  Although the clause 
protects the accused against the admission of testimonial hearsay in a criminal trial, it does not 
protect against the State using all non-cross-examined hearsay.  Id. at 882.  Particularly, when 
the defendant’s own statement constitutes the hearsay, the Confrontation Clause will not bar 
its use by the prosecution.  Id. (finding no evidentiary error in the State using a self-
represented defendant’s opening statement at trial against him as evidence of guilt); Peterson 
v. State, 129 So. 3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that an automobile’s 
computer-generated air bag control system report was non-testimonial, as it was non-
accusatory and did not describe any specific wrongdoing).  Although the court did not reject 
the defendant’s argument on this basis, the author believes a better ground is that the report 
was not hearsay to begin with, as it did not constitute an assertion by any person.  See FLA. 
STAT. § 90.801(1)(a); Peterson, 129 So. 3d at 453.  Thus, there was no statement under the 
definition of the hearsay rule.  Peterson, 129 So. 3d at 453 (defining statement); see also FLA. 
STAT. § 90.801(1)(a). 
The right to confrontation does not protect an accused against the introduction of 
physical evidence or testimony about unavailable physical evidence.  See Yero v. State, 138 
So. 3d 1179, 1184 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation 
when the State introduced testimony from several witnesses who described how a theft 
defendant had appeared on subsequently destroyed video evidence).  The video had been 
overwritten before the State was able to secure it for trial.  Id. at 1183.  However, Yero’s 
confrontation rights were satisfied by his ability to cross-examine at trial the witness who 
testified about the tape’s contents.  Id. at 1184. 
15. See Lerner v. Halegua, 154 So. 3d 445, 447 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 
(finding that to admit still photographs taken of frames from a video surveillance tape, 
someone who knew about the operation and storage procedures for the tape was necessary to 
authenticate them to show their reliability). 
16. FLA. STAT. § 90.616(1).  Although this rule provides for the sequestration 
of witnesses upon a party request or a court order, it does not specify what remedies there are 
for violation of a sequestration order.  Id. 
In Cokely v. State, a proposed defense witness violated the trial court’s sequestration 
order by being present at a pre-trial stand-your-ground defense hearing and hearing an alleged 
battery victim testify.  Cokely v. State, 138 So. 3d 1204, 1205–07 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014).  At trial, the court, as a matter of law, excluded this witness’s testimony for violating 
its order without holding any hearing into the violation’s circumstances.  Id. at 1207 n.4.  The 
Fourth District reversed the defendant’s subsequent conviction.  Id. at 1209. 
In this situation, trial courts need to balance the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to present a defense against violation of the court’s sequestration order.  See U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI; Cokely, 138 So. 3d at 1208.  This requires the trial court to determine first, 
5
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II. RELEVANCY AND ITS GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Section 90.401 of the Code states that information that tends “to 
prove or disprove a material fact” is relevant. 19  Beyond this brief statement, 
relevancy cannot be defined by any code or set of rules.  Relevancy contains 
two sub-categories:  materiality and probative value.20  Materiality is usually 
a function of either the underlying claims and defenses in a particular lawsuit 
or of matters properly affecting witnesses’ credibility. 21   Whether 
information tends to prove or disprove 22  a material fact, and thus, is 
probative, depends upon the strength or weakness of the logical connection 
between the information and what it is offered to prove.23 
Since relevancy is mainly a function of logical deduction and 
substantive law, altering facts even slightly can affect information’s potential 
relevancy greatly. 24   Thus, cases discussing relevancy in general under 
                                                                                                                   
whether the defendant or defense counsel had been involved in causing the violation, and 
second, even if there was active defense involvement, the violation’s effect on the witness’s 
proposed testimony.  Id.  If the witness’s testimony would not have been substantially affected 
by hearing what the witness should not have heard, complete witness’s exclusion is too harsh 
a remedy.  See id.  Since the trial court never held any hearing on these issues, its virtually 
automatic exclusion of the witness was erroneous.  See id. at 1209. 
17. FLA. STAT. § 90.701 (permitting lay opinion testimony if doing so is 
necessary to convey the witness’s testimony and the opinions “do not require a special 
knowledge, skill, experience, or training”).  Two cases during this Survey discussed this rule.  
See Alvarez v. State, 147 So. 3d 537, 542 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Herring v. State, 132 
So. 3d 342, 346 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  In Herring, the court found that witnesses who 
knew and had seen the defendant around the time he had killed his father should have been 
allowed to give their opinion as to his sanity.  See 132 So. 3d at 344–46.  The witnesses were 
the defendant’s mother and a police officer, who apparently came to the victim’s home shortly 
after the killing while the defendant was still there.  Id. at 344.  However, the error was found 
harmless.  Id. at 346. 
However, in Alvarez, the same district court of appeal found reversible error in 
letting a police officer, testifying as a lay witness, give his opinion as to the skin color and 
race of a robbery and murder perpetrator who was captured on surveillance tape during the 
crime.  147 So. 3d at 538–39, 544.  The tape was admitted into evidence; thus the jurors could 
view it just as well as the officer and come to their own conclusions as to what it showed.  See 
id. at 539, 542.  The officer’s opinion was thus unnecessary, and any opinion as to identity 
should have been let to the jurors.  See id. at 542. 
18. See infra Part VII. 
19. FLA. STAT. § 90.401. 
20. Id. 
21. 1 CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, EHRHARDT’S FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 401.1 (2014 
ed.). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. See id.  There is a common assertion that no item of information is 
inherently relevant.  See id.  As a general proposition, this saying is correct.  See 1 EHRHARDT, 
supra note 21, at § 401.1. 
6
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section 90.401 of the Florida Statutes seldom have much precedential value 
as they are so fact specific.  During this Survey period, no case discussing 
general relevancy alone under section 90.401 of the Florida Statutes was 
unusual enough to merit extended discussion. 
However, general relevancy is not the end of the story for 
admissibility under the Code.  Once logical relevancy requirements have 
been satisfied, the Code expresses a preference that “[a]ll relevant evidence 
[be] admi[tted] except as provided by law.”25  This language encompasses 
reasons extending from evidence being excluded because of its substantive 
nature, such as hearsay or privilege, to evidence being excluded because of 
procedurally related problems, such as a question being asked outside the 
scope of cross-examination or evidence being offered to bolster a witness’s 
character for truthfulness before the witness’s credibility has been attacked.  
The substantive reason for excluding evidence that would otherwise be 
admissible under section 90.401 of the Florida Statutes may also stem from 
the information’s inherently prejudicial nature or the potential the evidence 
has for being confusing.26  In certain specific situations, the Code expressly 
provides for the exclusion of otherwise probative information.27 
No statutory scheme or evidence code can possibly specify every 
factual instance where evidence should be excluded because of its prejudicial 
or confusing nature.  The Code generally follows the Federal Rules of 
Evidence by providing for exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence when 
“its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence.”28 
There are two important points which should be remembered about 
this language.  First, only unfairly prejudicial types of evidence merit 
exclusion. 29   Evidence that fairly hurts the other side’s case or fairly 
advances the case of the proponent should not be excluded.  Second, even 
                                                 
25. FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (2014). 
26. Id. § 90.401. 
27. See id. § 90.407 (excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures 
when offered “to prove negligence, the existence of a product defect, or culpable conduct in 
connection with [an] event” causing injury or harm).  During this Survey period, no reported 
cases discussed this exclusionary rule.  See id. § 90.401; supra Part I. 
28. FLA. STAT. § 90.403.  Unlike the Code, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 also 
includes undue delay and wasting time as other reasons for exclusions.  FED. R. EVID. 403.  
But see FLA. STAT. § 90.403.  Section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes includes an additional 
sentence that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 does not.  Compare FLA. STAT. § 90.403, with 
FED. R. EVID. 403.  The section expressly provides that it “shall not be construed to mean that 
evidence of the existence of available third-party benefits is inadmissible.”  FLA. STAT. § 
90.403. 
29. See id. 
7
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unfairly prejudicial evidence will not be excluded unless its unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs any probative value the information has. 30
 There is a preference for admission when the balance between 
relevancy and prejudice, or other section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes 
concerns, is close or even.  Only a fairly gross disproportion of section 
90.403’s general concerns merits excluding any relevant evidence.  As with 
cases discussing logical relevancy, cases discussing section 90.403 are likely 
to be so fact bound that their precedential value is questionable.  However, 
one decision during 2014, refusing to reverse a death sentence for admission 
of potentially unfair prejudicial evidence, merits discussion.31 
Unfair prejudice exists when certain evidence is likely to arouse the 
jurors’ emotion in a way that would lead them to decide a matter on an 
improper basis.32  Poole v. State (Poole II)33 certainly has to potentially be 
considered such a situation, if one ever existed.34  Poole was convicted of 
first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, armed burglary, armed 
robbery, and sexual battery.35  The two victims, Loretta White and Noah 
Scott who lived together,36 went to sleep late one night after playing video 
games at their mobile home.37  Later that night, White woke up with Mark 
Poole on top of her pushing a pillow down on her face.38  He started to 
sexually assault her, and White begged him to stop and physically resisted.39  
                                                 
30. Id.  The words any probative value are purposefully used here to illustrate 
a very simple but often overlooked point with regard to arguments on admissibility.  See id.  
When arguing relevancy issues, attorneys should be careful to do so in a logical order.  If an 
attorney first argues that information should be excluded because its probative value is 
outweighed because of section 90.403 concerns, the attorney has implicitly conceded the 
information’s relevancy.  See id. § 90.403.  To then next argue the same information should be 
excluded under section 90.401 makes no sense.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.401.  If information has 
no relevancy under section 90.401, the considerations in section 90.403 do not matter.  Id. §§ 
90.401, .403.  The information should be excluded for lack of helpfulness to begin with.  See 
id. § 90.401. 
31. Poole v. State (Poole II), 151 So. 3d 402, 414–19 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 2052 (2015). 
32. Id. at 414.  For example, deciding a case on the basis of a party’s sexual 
orientation, race, or religion.  Id. at 409; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
33. 151 So. 3d 402 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2052 (2015). 
34. See id. at 414–16. 
35. Id. at 405. 
36. Poole v. State (Poole I), 997 So. 2d 382, 387 (Fla. 2008).  The two victims 
obviously had different last names.  Id.  Whether they were married to each other is not stated 
in either opinion discussing the case.  Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 406; Poole I, 997 So. 2d at 387.  
This fact is however completely irrelevant to the charges against the defendant.  Poole II, 151 
So. 3d at 406; Poole I, 997 So. 2d at 387. 
37. Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 406. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
8
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Poole then struck her several times with a tire iron, severing one finger and 
part of another finger from her hand.40  Scott woke up, attempted to help 
White, and in turn he was beaten by Poole with the tire iron.41  Scott died 
from the blunt force head trauma suffered in this beating.42  Poole finally left, 
and White passed out from his attacks. 43   She recovered early the next 
morning and called the police who came and found Scott dead.44  Besides 
losing the fingers, White suffered multiple face and head wounds plus a 
concussion.45  The evidence against Poole was extremely strong46—so strong 
that at trial his defense counsel in closing argument conceded his guilt on the 
sexual battery, robbery, and burglary charges.47  However, defense counsel 
argued he was not the person who inflicted the other injuries on the two 
victims.48  Not surprisingly, a jury convicted Poole of all charges and after a 
sentencing hearing, recommended death by a twelve to zero vote.49  The trial 
judge agreed with the jury and imposed a death sentence.50 
On direct appeal in Poole v. State (Poole I),51 the Supreme Court of 
Florida affirmed the defendant’s conviction but vacated the sentence and 
remanded for another hearing.52  Although Poole argued numerous errors had 
affected the fairness of the guilt phase of his trial, the court found that 
defense counsel’s failure to make contemporaneous objections waived many 
of these points for appeal.53  On the one point, defense counsel had promptly 
objected to an erroneous comment on the defendant’s silence at trial in 
closing argument, the Supreme Court of Florida found the trial court had not 
abused its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial.54  But when it came to 
the claimed errors in the sentencing hearing, the Supreme Court of Florida 
                                                 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 406. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id.  Witnesses placed Poole near the trial the night of the attack.  Poole II, 
151 So. 3d at 406.  He was found with several items stolen from the trailer and was found to 
have sold several others.  Id. at 407.  DNA evidence from a vaginal swab matched him to 
White’s attack, and other scientific evidence, such as fingerprints and blood stains, connected 
him to the crimes.  Id. 
47. Poole I, 997 So. 2d 382, 390 (Fla. 2008). 
48. Id. 
49. Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 407. 
50. Id. 
51. 997 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 2008). 
52. Id. at 397. 
53. Id. at 390–91.  Many of these claims of error involved the prosecutor’s 
statements in the closing argument, commenting on Poole’s silence after arrest and on his 
failure to testify at trial.  Id. at 391. 
54. Id. at 389. 
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reached a different result.55  Here, the court found that the defense counsel’s 
objections to improper cross-examination of the defense witness, about 
Poole’s prior convictions that were not statutory aggravating factors and 
about the content of a tattoo on Poole’s stomach that said Thug Life, required 
reversal for a new sentencing proceeding.56 
A new sentencing hearing was held, after which the jury voted 
eleven to one for death, and the trial court again sentenced Poole 
accordingly.57  On appeal from this second sentence, the Supreme Court of 
Florida affirmed the sentence.58  Again, defense counsel failed to preserve 
certain issues for appeal, either by not making prompt contemporaneous 
objections 59  or by not making certain legal arguments at the trial court 
level.60  However, one preserved issue brought up the issue of the evidence’s 
probative value versus potentially unfair prejudicial effect in a starkly 
dramatic fashion. 
At the new sentencing, the State introduced a jar of formalin liquid 
containing White’s severed fingertip.61  The defense apparently objected to 
this as unfairly prejudicial.62  What exactly was the prosecutor’s response to 
the objection at trial is unfortunately not clear from the Supreme Court of 
Florida’s opinion.  In the Court’s words, “the prosecutor offered no credible 
reason as to why the severed fingertip was relevant to any issue in the 
penalty phase, much less any issue in dispute.”63  This language can be read 
in two ways.  One, when the defense objected at trial, the prosecutor could 
not credibly articulate why the fingertip was relevant.  Two, the prosecutor 
did specify a reason for admitting the fingertip at trial, but the defense just 
did not agree it was a credible one.  If the Court meant the first interpretation, 
the remainder of its opinion is incredibly disturbing.  If the prosecutor could 
indeed articulate no credible reason for admission at trial, then any reason 
                                                 
55. See Poole I, 997 So. 2d at 391. 
56. Id. at 393. 
57. Poole II, 151 So. 3d 402, 408 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2052 
(2015). 
58. Id. at 405. 
59. See id. at 413.  These missed objections were the failure to make 
contemporaneous objections to the prosecutor’s comments in the closing, disparaging the 
testimony of the defendant’s family members as all that crap, to the prosecution’s potential 
mischaracterizing intoxication evidence, and to the prosecution’s legally erroneous comments 
about merger of the aggravating circumstances.  Id. at 415–17. 
60. Id. at 413.  Defense counsel’s failure to make legal arguments at trial that 
the State’s impermissible disparate questioning of prospective jurors had led to a racially 
impermissible use of preemptory challenges and waived this issue for appeal.  Poole II, 151 
So. 3d at 413–14. 
61. Id. at 414. 
62. Id. 
63. Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 414. 
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given then and any reason the State came up with on appeal is arguably 
disingenuous.  A more favorable reading is the alternative, that the State had 
a reason but the defense just did not find it a credible one.64 
Regardless of which alternative reading one chooses, the remainder 
of the Court’s opinion on this issue merits close inspection and criticism.  
The Court began by instructively laying out the process trial judges should 
follow when ruling on section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes objections.65  
This process involves two steps.66  “[T]he trial judge must first determine 
that the evidence is relevant for a specific purpose.”67  Then, the Court “must 
weigh the importance of the evidence to the specific purpose, against the 
possibility that the evidence will unfairly prejudice” the other side. 68  In 
Poole II, the defense objected to the fingertip being unfairly prejudicial in 
general and specifically objected to admitting the natural fingernails with the 
skin attached.69  The trial court rejected this, saying the fingertip was not 
difficult to look at, not unpleasant, and had no blood on it.70  Nowhere in the 
opinion is there any specific purpose that the trial court determined the tip 
was relevant for, nor does the Supreme Court of Florida mention any explicit 
weighing process the trial court went through. 
Despite this, the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion articulates its 
own basis for admission.71  As the fingertip “was severed during the same 
criminal episode at issue in this penalty phase,”72 and it was “relevant to the 
amount of force used during the attempted . . . murder,”73 it was relevant.74  
Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida supplied its own specific purpose for 
relevancy, despite the State’s potential inability to do so, and the trial judge’s 
apparent failure to do likewise.  Even if the State had articulated these two 
purposes, the two-step process still requires the weighing contemplated by 
step two.  Amazingly, the Supreme Court of Florida totally ignores this step 
and merely finds the fingertip’s admission was not an abuse of discretion.  
Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion ignores the very two-step 
process it had articulated should be done only paragraphs earlier! 
Since the Supreme Court of Florida did not do the second step of the 
weighing process, it is appropriate to discuss what might have been the result 
                                                 
64. See id. 
65. Id. at 414; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2014). 
66. Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 414. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. See Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 414–15. 
72. Id. at 414. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
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had it done so.  Assuming the fingertip had some relevancy, how necessary 
was its introduction to the State’s case?  Put another way, would refusing to 
admit the severed fingertip as an exhibit have deprived the State of its fair 
opportunity to argue about the amount of force Poole used in committing his 
crimes?  The State still could have produced testimony about the fingertip 
being severed and arguably would have had to do so to authenticate the 
exhibit.  Thus, admission of the actual fingertip was to some extent 
cumulative to the voice testimony.  Furthermore, assuming the victim, 
White, testified at the hearing,75 she might have been able to hold up her 
hand to show the jurors where her fingers had been severed,76 or there might 
have been photographs of her hand available.  What is the potential unfair 
prejudicial effect?  Obviously, the jury might become irrationally inflamed 
by seeing the fingertip, both during the admission of evidence and during its 
deliberations where they would have it available as an exhibit. 
By not following the very process its own opinion sets forth, the 
Court never addresses the balancing question of relevancy versus unfair 
prejudice.  Even more, by rendering the decision on this point that the court 
did, it arguably promotes bad lawyering.  The prosecution had already been 
reversed once because of the errors it created.77  One would think it would 
have been extra careful to not do so again, but reading this opinion’s 
description of what the prosecution did gives a different impression.  Finally, 
by rendering its decision on the basis it does, the Supreme Court of Florida 
also may send a message to trial judges that they will be protected from bad 
decisions.  In fairness to the Poole II opinion, it did conclude this matter by 
finding that any error would have been harmless anyways.78 
Precedents and decisions send messages beyond just this is what the 
law is.  Poole II could easily send the message that such potentially 
excessive lawyering will not only be excused by finding it harmless error in 
some cases, but also encouraged, by not finding it error to begin with.  One 
hopes that this is not the standard type of lawyering a court would want to 
promote. 
                                                 
75. Id.  If she did not, then how did the State authenticate the exhibit?  Poole 
II, 151 So. 3d at 414–15. 
76. See id.  The crimes took place the evening of October 12 through 13 of 
2001.  Id. at 406.  I say might here because White could have had cosmetic surgery done on 
her hand, so just displaying it would not accurately show the force.  Id. at 414–15.  Still, her 
testimony about this would have been available.  See id. 
77. See Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 408. 
78. See id. at 418–19. 
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III. SPECIAL RELEVANCY CONCERNS 
A. Statements in Plea Negotiations 
Section 90.410 of the Florida Statutes protects offers to plead guilty, 
pleas of nolo contendere, and withdrawn guilty pleas from admission in any 
civil cases and most criminal cases.79  It also protects against admission of 
statements made in connection with negotiations for these pleas. 80   The 
purpose behind this protection is to encourage the state and defense to 
engage in plea discussions and to resolve more charges without full-blown 
trials whenever possible.81  Promoting free discussion in negotiations without 
having the fear one’s words will come back to haunt a party is thought to 
further these two goals.82 
However, section 90.410 of the Florida Statutes does not define what 
should be considered plea negotiations—or to use the statute’s words, 
“statements made in connection with any of the [covered] pleas or offers.”83 
Thus, parties may still, on occasion, unwittingly make careless 
statements about possible plea offers that come back to haunt them.  As most 
criminal defense lawyers also know, sometimes accused parties can become 
some of their own worst enemies.  Both these principles were recently 
illustrated by a decision briefly discussing section 90.410 of the Florida 
Statutes.  In Bass v. State,84 the State charged the defendant with second-
degree murder and armed robbery.85  Sometime before trial, Bass had been 
incarcerated, and defense counsel received a potential twenty-year plea offer 
from the State.86  Counsel transmitted this potential plea offer to Bass, who 
decided he wanted to first talk to his mother about it.87  The facts do not 
indicate whether defense counsel knew of Bass’s desire to do this.  Bass 
talked to his mother about the offer the day after defense counsel told Bass 
                                                 
79. FLA. STAT. § 90.410 (2014).  It does not, however, protect against 
admission of guilty pleas that have not been withdrawn.  See id.  Federal Rule of Evidence 
410—the federal counterpart—covers the same types of pleas and statements made in plea 
negotiations, but it does not offer as broad a protection against admission in all cases.  
Compare FED. R. EVID. 410, with FLA. STAT. § 90.410. 
80. FLA. STAT. § 90.410. 
81. See FED. R. EVID. 410; FLA. STAT. § 90.410; United States v. Herman, 544 
F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1977). 
82. See Herman, 544 F.2d at 796. 
83. FLA. STAT. § 90.410. 
84. 147 So. 3d 1033 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 163 So. 3d 
507 (Fla. 2015). 
85. Id. at 1034. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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about it.88  Unfortunately for Bass, the State recorded his phone discussion89 
with his mother and later offered it at his trial and again, in the State’s 
closing argument90 to show Bass’s consciousness of his own guilt.91 
Defense counsel, during a hearing on the State’s motion in limine to 
use the conversation, argued it should be protected since a plea had been 
made and Bass was talking with his mother in connection with this offer.92  
The trial court disagreed, and the appellate affirmed this decision.93  The 
First District Court of Appeal said that to decide if statements were made in 
connection with plea offers and thus protected under section 90.410 of the 
Florida Statutes, the first step was looking at the plain meaning of the rule.94  
If the answer was not clear from the rule’s plain meaning, then a totality of 
circumstances approach should be taken. 95   This totality included two 
factors:  “[W]hether the defendant had a subjective expectation of engaging 
in plea negotiations when the statements were made, and, if so, whether the 
expectation was . . . reasonable.”96  Under either step, the district court found 
against Bass.97  First, the State’s offer was not definite, only a pending one.98  
Second, Bass’s statements about not taking twenty years but willing to 
accept less only came up in response to his mother’s question about the 
potential length of his sentence.99  Nothing Bass said about being willing or 
unwilling to take a certain length of time had yet, or later was, communicated 
to the State in response to the pending offer.100  Additionally, what Bass was 
really telling his mother was merely what his attorney had told him, not the 
traditional give and take one expects in plea discussions.101  His rejection of 
the State’s offer the next day after the conversation further indicated Bass did 
                                                 
88. Id. at 1034–35. 
89. Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1034–35.  The State did not allow Bass to call his 
mother the day defense counsel relayed the plea offer but permitted Bass to do so the next 
day.  Id. 
90. Id.  In the conversation, Bass told his mother he expected to have to serve 
some prison time, but told her he would not accept the twenty-year offer and would instead 
accept one of fifteen or sixteen years.  Id. at 1034. 
91. Id. 
92. Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1034–35. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1035; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.410 (2014). 
95. Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1035; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.410; United States v. 
Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978). 
96. Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1035 (citing Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1366). 
97. Id. 
98. Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1035. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 1036. 
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not have a subjective expectation that he was engaging in plea discussions 
when talking with his mother.102 
The court’s opinion illustrates that there is a difference between 
actually engaging in plea discussions and talking about plea discussions in 
general—especially when the person the discussions are being talked about 
with is not one’s own attorney or an agent of the state.  The decision also 
illustrates another important point that defense counsel should strictly follow.  
Never let your client talk about his case with anyone outside your presence, 
and especially, never let your client talk about his case with anyone else but 
counsel—even family members—during a phone call from a jail or 
correctional facility as these conversations are regularly recorded.  Defense 
counsel, at their initial contact with clients, should remember to 
automatically warn them about this.  Bass illustrates that warning family 
members about this is also a good idea.103 
B. Compromises and Offers to Compromise 
Similar to its provision on pleas and plea negotiations in criminal 
cases, the Code seeks to promote settlement negotiations as a favored way of 
resolving disputes between private parties.104  Section 90.408 of the Florida 
Statutes protects compromises, offers to compromise, and statements or 
conduct made during bona fide settlement negotiations conducted in good 
faith efforts to achieve resolutions before trial.105  A recent case demonstrates 
that Florida law is strict on this point, even stricter than its federal rule 
counterpart.106  Panama City-Bay County Airport & Industrial District v. 
Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.,107 arose from litigation following the 
building of a new airport in Panama City.108  When the airport opened in 
2010, a storm water retention pond had to be rebuilt to comply with Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection regulations.109  Four main parties 
had been involved in the planning and construction of the airport and pond:  
the Panama City Airport District (“the Airport”), a plans and specification 
designer (“Atkins North America” or “Atkins”), a construction and program 
                                                 
102. Id. 
103. See Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1034–36. 
104. See FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (2014). 
105. Id. 
106. See FED. R. EVID. 408; FLA. STAT. § 90.408; Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & 
Indus. Dist. v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 140 So. 3d 1112, 1116–17 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 163 So. 3d 510 (Fla. 2015). 
107. 140 So. 3d 1112 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 163 So. 3d 
510 (Fla. 2015). 
108. Id. at 1113. 
109. Id. at 1113–14. 
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management overseer (“Kellog Brown” or “KBR”), and a prime construction 
contractor (“Phoenix Construction Services” or “Phoenix”). 110   After the 
pond had to be rebuilt, numerous claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, and 
third-party claims were filed among the four main parties.111 
By trial, only claims between the Airport and KBR remained.112  The 
rest had been disposed of by various settlements.113  One settlement was 
between the Airport and Phoenix.114  In that settlement, the Airport admitted 
liability to Phoenix. 115   Phoenix accepted liquidated damages from the 
Airport in return for a share of any recovery in the lawsuit remaining 
between the Airport, KBR, and at that time, Atkins.116  Under the agreement, 
the Airport and Phoenix would cooperate in this remaining litigation by 
using the airport’s general counsel and common counsel paid for by 
Phoenix.117  The agreement also provided that both Phoenix and the Airport 
retained control of their own claims and could settle them independently.118  
Both the Airport and Phoenix settled before trial with Atkins, and neither 
Atkins nor Phoenix remained a party when the case went to trial.119 
Before trial, the Airport’s counsel moved in limine to exclude any 
evidence of Phoenix’s settlement offer or of the Airport-Phoenix settlement 
agreement itself.120  The trial court excluded terms of any offer but permitted 
the agreement to be disclosed.121  KBR disclosed the agreement at trial, using 
it to impeach some of the Airport’s witnesses and to advance KBR’s 
counterclaims.122  After a jury verdict for KBR and denial of a new trial, the 
Airport appealed.123 
In a short but important opinion, the First District reversed.124  The 
district court’s opinion focused on both section 90.408 and section 46.015(3) 
of the Florida Statutes, which the court found required this result.125  Both 
statutory sections prohibited the admission of completed settlement 
                                                 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 1114. 
112. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1114. 
113. See id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1114. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 1114–15. 
122. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1115. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 1117. 
125. Id. at 1115–16; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 46.015(3), 90.408 (2014). 
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agreements, and section 46.015(3) additionally prohibited telling the jury a 
party has been dismissed from a lawsuit because of such.126 
KBR made two arguments why the apparently complete statutory 
bans in the two provisions should not be followed.127  KBR claimed the 
settlement between the Airport and Phoenix amounted to a Mary-Carter style 
agreement that Florida case law had found outside the statutory bans.128  
Mary-Carter agreements exist when one of multiple parties to litigation 
enters into a secret agreement with another party to reduce the first party’s 
exposure in the lawsuit and to have the second party remain in the lawsuit so 
that the two can secretly work against some or all of the remaining non-
parties to the agreement.129  These agreements were found to undermine the 
openness and integrity of the trial process by creating sham adversary 
relationships between name parties. 130   Thus, when such agreements are 
made, a non-party to them can inform the jury of their existence. 131  
However, here, the settlement arrangement was considered different. 132  
Phoenix did not remain a party to the litigation after the agreement with the 
Airport.133   Second, even though the Airport and Phoenix agreed to use 
common counsel, each retained control of its remaining claims and each did 
settle its remaining claims with some of the parties.134  Thus, the subterfuge 
and prospects of subterfuge existing in a Mary-Carter Agreement situation 
were not present.135 
Finally, any argument that the settlement’s existence should be 
admissible to show possible bias was rejected.136  As the court said, these 
two statutory sections contain neither explicit nor implicit exceptions for 
impeachment. 137   Thus, Florida evidence law, unlike the federal rule 
                                                 
126. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1115–16; see also 
FLA. STAT. §§ 46.015(3), 90.408. 
127. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1115–17. 
128. Id. at 1116. 
129. Id.; Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1078, 1083 n.3 (Fla. 
2009) (defining Mary-Carter Agreement); Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 
1993). 
130. Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1083; Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 246; Pan. City-Bay 
Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1116. 
131. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1116; see also 
Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 243. 
132. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1117. 
133. Id. at 1116. 
134. Id. at 1114. 
135. Id. at 1116. 
136. Id. at 1115–17. 
137. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1115–16; see also 
FLA. STAT. §§ 46.015(3), 90.408 (2014). 
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regarding settlements and offers,138 has made the policy choice in favor of 
broad exclusion of this type of evidence.139 
C. Character Evidence 
Character is one area of evidence law which seems to present many 
problems.  As a general rule, evidence is usually forbidden in any case, 
criminal or civil, to prove that a person has a certain general character or type 
of character trait, and acted consistently with this on a particular occasion.140  
This is commonly called the propensity rule.141  Evidence is not admissible 
to show someone has a propensity to act a certain way and followed this 
propensity at a particular time.142  Character evidence can be shown by one 
of three methods:  testimony as to one’s reputation in the community, 
testimony about a witness’s personal opinion of someone else’s character, or 
testimony about past specific acts of conduct of the person whose character 
is to be proven.143 
Despite the general prohibition, not every use of character evidence 
to show propensity is forbidden.144  Similarly, not every use of one of the 
three methods of proving character even involves character evidence at all.145  
A recent case during this Survey period demonstrates both an exception to 
the ban on character evidence to show action in conformity therewith and 
also how proof of someone’s reputation may not necessarily involve 
character evidence at all.146 
Antoine v. State 147  involved charges against the accused of first-
degree murder and of attempted first-degree murder, both by use of a 
                                                 
138. FED. R. EVID. 408.  Federal Rule of Evidence 408 explicitly contains an 
impeachment exception to the rule’s broad provisions on exclusion to show validity or 
invalidity of claim.  Id.  Federal Rule of Evidence 408 by its explicit terms does not allow 
statements made in settlement negotiations to be used to impeach by inconsistent statements.  
Id. 
139. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1117; see also 
FLA. STAT. § 90.408. 
140. Fed. R. Evid. 404. 
141. See id.; Antoine v. State, 138 So. 3d 1064, 1075 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014). 
142. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).  This prohibition is embodied in the 
introductory language to section 90.404(1) of the Florida Statutes:  “Evidence of a person’s 
character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a 
particular occasion . . . .”  FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1). 
143. FED. R. EVID. 405(a)–(b). 
144. See id. 404(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
145. See id. 405(a)–(b). 
146. See Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1075–76. 
147. 138 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
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firearm. 148   The jury could not reach a verdict on the first charge but 
convicted Antoine on the second one.149  Both charges arose from the same 
unfortunate incident at a Palm Beach nightclub late one evening.150  The two 
victims, Brandon Hammond and Jeffrey Thompson, had been ejected from 
the nightclub twice that evening for their rowdy behavior.151  They returned a 
third time and managed to get themselves thrown out again.152  After their 
third ejection, Hammond and Thompson had a confrontation outside the 
nightclub with some men who were leaving.153  The defendant, Narcisse 
Antoine, tried to intervene and make peace.154  The two victims turned their 
attention to Antoine both with racial statements and threats of violence.155 
The club’s bouncer, Tyrone Slade, was also present when this 
occurred.156  Slade testified that Thompson gave him “the impression . . . he 
was about to sneak up and attack.”157  Hammond then hit Antoine in the jaw, 
splitting his lip.158  Antoine gave Slade the drink he was holding and pulled 
out a handgun.159  Slade later testified about the subsequent events.160  Even 
then, Antoine did not immediately fire on either man.161  Hammond began 
“‘reaching in his pants as if he had a gun’” 162  while racially cursing 
Antoine.163  Slade, the bouncer, heard Antoine asking Hammond if he was 
armed and if he planned to shoot Antoine.164  Slade also asked Hammond 
what he was reaching for and told him to stop.165   The defendant shot 
Hammond multiple times, killing him, and shooting Thompson. 166  
Thompson survived this shooting but was in a coma for some days 
afterward.167  At trial, he was unable to remember the events surrounding the 
                                                 
148. Id. at 1068. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1067. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 1068. 
157. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1068. 
158. Id. at 1068. 
159. Id. at 1069. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1069. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id.  Slade supposedly told Hammond, “[Do not] do this Brandon.”  Id. 
166. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1069, 1071. 
167. Id. at 1071. 
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shootings.168  A security guard at a nearby parking lot corroborated Slade’s 
testimony.169 
Antoine testified at trial, claiming self-defense for both shootings.170  
He said that earlier that evening, he had intervened inside the nightclub to 
prevent a fight between Hammond, Thompson, and three other men. 171  
Then, when Antoine left, he saw Hammond and Thompson trying to provoke 
another fight outside.172  Hammond had punched him and then threatened 
him with physical harm, including a threat to kill.173  Antoine said that when 
Hammond reached inside his own shirt, he was convinced Hammond was 
going to kill him first.174  Antoine then shot Hammond and shot Thompson 
whom Antoine claimed appeared to be reaching for a gun and coming 
towards Antoine.175  Antoine drove off, talked to an attorney early the next 
morning and was arrested later on.176 
Slade knew Hammond’s family and also knew Hammond’s 
reputation for violence and being a drunk. 177  A second bouncer at the 
nightclub also gave reputation testimony about Hammond’s reputation for 
violence.178  The trial court used Florida Jury Instruction—Criminal 3.6(f)—
on the significance of the reputation evidence to the self-defense claim.179  
This instruction required that not only must a victim have a reputation for 
violence, but that a defendant must also know of this reputation before a jury 
could consider it.180  The defense objected to requiring Antoine to know of 
Hammond’s reputation and requested an additional instruction that the jury 
could independently consider the victim’s reputation for violence when 
determining who was the first aggressor.  The judge denied the request and 
kept the instructions’ original wording. 
                                                 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 1069. 
170. Id. at 1067. 
171. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1070. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. (alteration in original). 
175. Id. at 1070–71. 
176. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1071. 
177. Id. at 1072. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id.  The exact instruction the trial court gave was as follows:   
If you find that Brandon C. Hammond had a reputation of being a violent and 
dangerous person, and that their [sic] reputation was known to the defendant, you 
may consider the fact in determining whether the actions of the defendant were 
those of a reasonable person in dealing with an individual of that reputation. 
Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1072. 
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a 
new trial due to error in this instruction.  Section 90.404 of the Florida 
Statutes establishes one of the statutory exceptions to the ban on 
circumstantial use of character evidence.  This exception explicitly provides 
that “evidence of a pertinent trait of character trait of the victim of the 
[alleged] crime” is admissible when offered by the accused to prove the 
victim acted in conformity therewith.181  Furthermore, when the character 
evidence is so offered, reputation testimony is the appropriate method of 
doing so. 182   Thus, the trial court’s instructions were erroneous for two 
reasons:  First, they conditioned the jury’s consideration of Hammond’s 
reputation for violence on Antoine’s knowledge of this fact.183  Second, they 
did not tell the jury that if it found Hammond had such a reputation, the jury 
could use this in considering whether he acted in conformity therewith before 
the shooting, namely engaged in violent acts or threatening violent acts that 
caused Antoine to react in self-defense.  Why is the defendant’s actual 
knowledge of the victim’s reputation for violence required?  As the district 
court said, “‘because the evidence is offered to show the conduct of the 
victim, rather than the defendant’s state of mind.’”184  If Antoine’s self-
defense claim had been predicated on previous violent acts of Hammond 
towards others, Antoine would have had to know about them for them to be 
relevant as they would have gone to his state of mind, not the victim’s 
conduct.  Indeed, under Florida evidence law, previous acts of someone are 
usually not allowed to prove that person’s subsequent action in conformity 
therewith.185 
Would Antoine’s knowledge of Hammond’s reputation have been 
helpful to his self-defense claim?  Yes, in that case Antoine would have been 
able to use the reputation evidence two ways, instead of one:  First, to show 
Hammond’s action in conformity therewith as the first aggressor;186 second, 
to show the reasonableness of Antoine’s claim that he feared he would be 
shot and so fired first.187  But just because the second way was foreclosed 
due to the defendant not actually knowing Hammond’s reputation, this 
should not legally prevent him from using it the other way.188 
                                                 
181. FLA. STAT. §90.405(1) (2014). 
182. Id.  Unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence, Florida does not allow proof of 
circumstantial character by personal opinion. 
183. Id. at 1075. 
184. Id. (quoting Dwyer v. State, 743 So. 2d 46, 48 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 
1999)). 
185. FLA. STAT. § 90.404. 
186. See Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1076.; FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1). 
187. See Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1076. 
188. See id. at 1075–76.  The jury had deadlocked on the murder charge 
involving Hammond’s death but convicted on the attempted murder charge for shooting 
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D. Williams Rule Issues–Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts 
As noted above, when character evidence is used to prove the 
defendant has a certain character trait to further prove the defendant has a 
tendency to act in accord with this trait, the propensity rule is violated.189  
This violation occurs however the character trait would be proven—whether 
by reputation, opinion, or specific acts of past conduct.190  Evidence law 
recognizes that a person’s past bad acts can be relevant for legitimate non-
propensity purposes.191  In Florida, this use of collateral crimes evidence is 
called Williams Rule evidence.192 
The Code has codified the Williams Rule.193  Section 90.404(2)(a) of 
the Florida Statutes states that “[s]imiliar fact evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue . 
. . but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad 
character or propensity.”194  What might these material facts be?  The section 
lists them as “including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.”195 
While the Williams Rule has a similar counterpart in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence,196 there are several differences between the two that are 
actually more favorable to defendants in Florida.  First, in Florida, the state 
must give the defense notice of its intent to use such evidence and a 
description of it ten days before trial.197  In a federal court, the prosecution 
must only provide reasonable notice of such. 198  Second, under the federal 
rules, the existence of the accused’s other crimes must only be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence.199  In Florida, it must be established by clear 
                                                                                                                   
Thompson.  Id. at 1068.  However, since both charges stemmed from the same series of 
events, if the jury had found Antoine’s actions in shooting Hammond reasonable, it might 
have also done so in connection with the immediate shooting of Thompson afterwards.  See id. 
at 1075–76.  Thus, reversal was needed.  See id. at 1078. 
189. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). 
190. See id. 404(a)(1), 405. 
191. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 659, 661 (Fla. 1959). 
192. Id. at 659. 
193. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (2014). 
194. FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (2)(a). 
195. Id. 
196. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
197. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(d)(1). 
198. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2)(A). 
199. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 684 (1988). 
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and convincing evidence.200  Third, in Florida the evidence cannot be so 
focused upon that it becomes a feature of the trial.201 
More reported cases discussed this section of the relevancy rules 
than any other. 202   Cases discussing section 90.404(2)(a) of the Florida 
Statutes generated a fair number of reversals.203 
1. To Prove Matters Independent of Section 404(2) 
a. Inextricably Intertwined Evidence 
Sometimes to tell a coherent story, the State must introduce other 
acts evidence that is not directly related to the crimes charged.204  When this 
happens, the other crimes evidence is admissible.205  Some jurisdictions call 
this evidence of the res gestae. 206   In Florida, this type of other crimes 
evidence is referred to as inextricably intertwined evidence.207  Technically 
speaking, it is not Williams Rule evidence because its purpose is not to prove 
or disprove an element of the case.208  Rather its purpose is to prevent the 
story of the case from becoming confused, broken, or disjointed.209  Thus, 
some courts then do not require the State to follow section 90.404(2) of the 
Florida Statutes’ usual notification provisions.210 
                                                 
200. See McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1256 (Fla. 2006). 
201. Id.; see also Barnett v. State, 151 So. 3d 61, 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (during this Survey period rejecting the argument that the Williams Rule evidence had 
improperly become a feature of the trial). 
202. McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1251; Carlisle v. State, 137 So. 3d 479, 486 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Barnett, 151 So. 3d at 63. 
203. See FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a) (2014).  There was reversal in six cases 
where the state introduced evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, and reversal in one case 
where the defense was denied the right to introduce Reverse Williams Rule evidence.  See 
Moore v. State, 143 So. 3d 468, 469 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Parker v. State, 142 So. 3d 
960, 965 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Kyne v. State 141 So. 3d 759, 764 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014); Jackson v. State, 140 So. 3d 1067, 1073 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Carlisle, 
137 So. 3d at 487.  The one Reverse Williams Rule case was Carlisle, where the court found 
the defense should have been allowed to cross-examine an alleged sexual battery victim about 
her earlier recantation of other sexual claims against the defendant.  Carlisle, 137 So. 3d at 
483–84, 487.  The questioning would have been admissible to show a motive to falsify on the 
victim’s part.  Id. at 484. 
204. Kyne v. State, 141 So. 3d 759, 762 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
205. Id. 
206. State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1988). 
207. Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 762. 
208. See Williams v. State, 621 So. 2d 413, 414–15 (Fla. 1993); Kyne, 141 So. 
3d at 762. 
209. Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 762. 
210. See FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2) (2014).  Kyne v. State, where the State argued 
no notice was due because the defense as evidence of prior threats between the defendant and 
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When other crimes or acts evidence is offered under the inextricably 
intertwined rationale, courts must be especially careful to make sure the 
evidence is necessary or else risk a high chance of reversal. 211   This is 
especially true because the other acts evidence is often potentially 
inflammatory in nature.212  During this Survey period, four cases where the 
State introduced evidence under the inextricably intertwined rationale 
resulted in conviction reversals. 213   Three of the four shared a common 
characteristic.214  They all involved evidence of possession of handguns or 
other firearms as the alleged inextricably intertwined acts.215 
Parker v. State216 provides the most overall instructive discussion of 
the three.  Parker’s vehicle was pulled over for a traffic routine stop, during 
which an officer saw a gun partially sticking out between the vehicle’s 
seats.217  The officer had Parker exit the vehicle and arrested him when it was 
discovered Parker was a convicted felon. 218   Later, during an inventory 
search, officers discovered illegal narcotics inside the vehicle.219  Parker was 
charged with multiple drug possession offenses as well as being a felon in 
possession of a firearm.220  The State severed the firearm possession charge 
                                                                                                                   
his step-father weeks before the defendant allegedly strangled his mother, was inextricably 
intertwined with the killing.  Kyne v. State, 141 So. 3d at 760–61.  The district court of appeal 
rejected this argument and also held that while the evidence might have been otherwise 
admissible as Williams Rule evidence, this could not be considered on appeal due to the 
state’s failure to supply the notice required under section 90.404(2)(d)(1) of the Florida 
Statutes.  Id. at 763; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(d)(1). 
Kyne sends an important message to the state.  If other acts are allegedly admissible 
as both inextricably intertwined with charged offenses’ facts and also separately admissible as 
Williams Rule evidence, careful prosecutors will always provide notice of intent to use such.  
Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 763.  Thus, if an appellate court later rejects the inextricably intertwined 
grounds, the state can preserve its ability to argue Williams Rule evidence as a fall back 
position.  Id. 
211. Id. 
212. See Williams, 621 So. 2d at 415. 
213. Parker v. State 142 So. 3d 960, 963 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see 
also Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 761; Tolbert v. State, 154 So. 3d 1141, 1142–43 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014); Francois v. State, 132 So. 3d 1206, 1207 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
214. Parker, 142 So. 3d at 963; Tolbert, 154 So. 3d at 1142; Francois, 132 So. 
3d at 1207–08.  Kyne is the fourth and only non-weapons case where admission of other bad 
acts evidence caused reversal as not being inextricably intertwined with events surroundings 
the charges and not otherwise admissible under the Williams Rule.  Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 763. 
215. See Parker, 142 So. 3d at 963; Tolbert, 154 So. 3d at 1142; Francois, 132 
So. 3d at 1207–08. 
216. 142 So. 3d 960 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
217. Id. at 962. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
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before trial.221  The defense moved to exclude any evidence relating to the 
gun found in car as unnecessary to prove the remaining drug charges.222  The 
State claimed that testimony about finding the gun was needed to explain 
why the vehicle was searched and the drugs subsequently found.223  The trial 
court agreed with this argument.224  At trial, the first officer was allowed to 
talk about finding the gun and how the defendant’s hand was near where the 
gun was actually found.225  Not only was this testimony given but also the 
State physically introduced the gun as an exhibit. 226   A second officer 
testified Parker had been arrested for possessing the weapon, but the trial 
court sustained an objection to this, and the jury was instructed to ignore 
it.227 
The Fourth District listed four instances where uncharged acts or 
crimes evidence would be considered inextricably intertwined with the 
charges against an accused.228  When the evidence was necessary to “(1) 
adequately describe the deed; (2) provide an intelligent account of the 
crime(s) charged; (3) establish the entire context out of which the charged 
crime(s) arose, or (4) adequately describe the events leading up to the 
charged crime(s).”229  Here, it seemed as if the State was relying on either the 
third or fourth reasons to justify the testimony and the gun’s admission.230  
Whatever the State’s reason was, the Fourth District of Appeal reversed the 
conviction.231  The court found that testimony about the gun was totally 
unnecessary to prove the drug charges. 232   The State could have just 
produced testimony about finding the drugs in Parker’s car during a search 
car.  Additionally, error in admitting the gun-related testimony was 
compounded by admitting the gun itself as an exhibit. 233   The gun’s 
admission aggravated matters by “giving the weapon featured billing during 
the trial.”234 
                                                 
221. Parker, 142 So. 3d at 962. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Parker, 142 So. 3d at 962. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 963. 
229. Id. (quoting McGee v. State, 19 So. 3d 1074, 1078 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2009)). 
230. See Parker, 142 So. 3d at 962. 
231. Id. at 965. 
232. Id. at 963–64. 
233. Id. at 963. 
234. Id. 
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Perhaps the most flagrant of the three cases involving reversals for 
uncharged weapons testimony is Francois v. State. 235   There the State 
charged the accused with armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed 
robbery.236  The robbery victim and other witnesses said a handgun had been 
used in the crime.237  This gun was never found.238  Police officers went to 
the defendant’s residence and found four rifles there, one of which was under 
a bed and another sticking out from a mattress.239  The State argued that 
evidence of the rifles in the home showed Francois could have also once 
possessed the handgun and hidden it after the robbery. 240  Evidently, the 
reasoning went something like this–people who possess firearms in general 
are likely to possess a particular type of firearm and when that firearm is 
used in a crime they are likely to hide it.  Of course, part of this reasoning 
rests on using evidence for prohibited propensity purposes.  The other part—
that someone who commits a crime with a weapon is likely to hide the 
weapon to avoid detection—could have been made without introduction of 
any evidence about the rifles at all.  The trial court termed this argument 
“tenuous, at best, and labeled it far-fetched.”241  Surprisingly after declaring 
such, the judge admitted the rifles believing “the evidence comprised part of 
the police investigation and that Francois would not be prejudiced by the 
testimony.”242  In a short opinion, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed 
finding the evidence totally irrelevant to prove anything about the missing 
handgun.243  Additionally, there was no proof that Francois’s possession of 
the rifles was not perfectly legal.244  The court recognized that admitting 
testimony evidence about the rifles created a very real risk that “the jurors 
[would] conclude . . . Francois exhibited a propensity to commit crimes.”245 
All three cases could be described as good examples of prosecutor 
attempts at overkill causing reversals. 246   Unfortunately, there are also 
examples where trial courts did not give careful scrutiny to arguments and 
                                                 
235. 132 So. 3d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
236. Id. at 1207. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. Francois, 132 So. 3d at 1207. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. (emphasis added). 
243. Id. at 1209. 
244. Id. 
245. Francois, 132 So. 3d at 1209. 
246. See id. 132 So. 3d at 1209; Parker, 142 So. 3d at 964; Tolbert, 154 So. 3d 
at 1143.  The third case is Tolbert v. State, which involved testimony about a handgun found 
in the same bag as illegal drugs.  Tolbert v. State, 154 So. 3d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014).  There was no proof connecting Tolbert to the gun, nor proof that he illegally 
possessed it.  Id. at 1142–43. 
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evidence offered for admission.247  The lesson to be learned from all three 
reversals is simple:  Inextricably intertwined is not a magic argument or 
phrase that will automatically allow in other crimes or acts evidence not 
essentially connected to the crimes charged.  This is especially so when the 
other acts involve weapons possession. 
b. To Legally Establish an Element of the Charged Offense 
There is another, probably an even more rare, non-Williams Rule 
reason to legitimately present uncharged collateral crimes evidence.248  There 
may be a legal necessity to present other crimes evidence when proof of an 
earlier act or crime is an essential element of a later charged offense.249  In 
this situation, the extent of the other crimes evidence should be determined 
by the elements of the charged offense. 
Spipniewiski v. State 250  involved charges of aggravated stalking, 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and misdemeanor battery.251  The 
victim and defendant were neighbors who had once been on good terms.252  
Trouble started when the victim who had been giving the defendant food, 
rides, and money told him she would no longer do so.253   The charges 
concerned events that happened from January to December 16, 2011.254  The 
State produced evidence that the defendant had punched the victim in 
November 2011, approached her swinging a bat in December 2011, and 
pulled her hair and bit her in December 2011.255  The November punching 
incident was also the subject of a separate misdemeanor charge in county 
court.256 
The Third District found the punching incident testimony relevant to 
the charge of aggravated stalking.257  As part of this charge, the State had to 
show the defendant had engaged in a course of conduct designed to 
repeatedly harass her, and that the defendant threatened the victim with 
                                                 
247. Id. at 1142–43; Parker, 142 So. 3d at 961, 964; Francois, 132 So. 3d at 
1208–09. 
248. Spipniewski v. State, 134 So. 3d 563, 565 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
249. See id. 
250. 134 So. 3d 563 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
251. Id. at 564.  Originally, there was a fourth charge—harassing the victim—
but the State dropped this before trial.  Id.  The opinion does not explain why.  See id. 
252. See id. 
253. Spipniewski, 134 So. 3d at 564. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 564–65. 
256. Id. at 565. 
257. Id. 
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intent to make her fearful of death or bodily injury.258  Course of conduct as 
defined in the aggravated stalking statute is “a pattern of conduct composed 
of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a 
continuity of purpose.”259  Thus, the other acts evidence was directly relevant 
and legally necessary to prove the aggravated stalking charge.260  Ultimately, 
the jury convicted the defendant of simple stalking; thus, in any event, 
admission of the other acts would have been harmless even if done in 
error.261 
2. To Prove Traditional Williams Rule Issues 
As mentioned, section 90.404(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes lists a 
number of reasons why other crimes or acts evidence is relevant, besides 
solely showing propensity.262  The list follows the inclusionary approach, 
and is not intended to be exclusive but merely to give examples of the most 
common, legitimate Williams Rule purposes. 263   During this Survey, 
Williams Rule evidence was admitted to prove a number of matters, 
mentioned264 and unmentioned265 in the section.266  Some decisions show 
how careless counsel is in urging admission of this evidence and how 
careless courts are in going along with their arguments.  It should never be 
sufficient for counsel to just laundry list the issues given in the Rule as 
reasons why the evidence should be admitted.  Courts should not allow such 
laundry listing to occur, but sometimes this happens.267  Fortunately one 
opinion during this Survey provides an excellent example of the careful 
                                                 
258. Spipniewski, 134 So. 3d at 566; see also FLA. STAT. § 784.048(3) (2014).  
259. FLA. STAT. § 784.048(1)(b). 
260. Spipniewski, 134 So. 3d at 566. 
261. Id. 
262. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a). 
263. See id.; Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 659–60 (Fla. 1959). 
264. Two cases involved Williams Rule evidence offered at trial to prove 
intent.  See Barnett v. State, 151 So. 3d 61, 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Jackson v. State, 
140 So. 3d 1067, 1070 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  Two cases involved used it to show 
identity.  See Barnett, 151 So. 3d at 63–64; Lewis v. State, 143 So. 3d 998, 1000, 1002 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
265. See Peralta-Morales v. State, 143 So. 3d 483, 485 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (finding the evidence admissible to show consciousness of guilt).  The author 
strenuously disagrees with this conclusion and believes the evidence was improperly admitted 
as proof of propensity. 
266. See FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a). 
267. See, e.g., Barnett, 151 So. 3d at 63 (where this happened at the trial level).  
On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the admission of the evidence but after conducting a 
much more careful analysis and after correctly concluding it was admissible to prove identity 
and motive.  Id. at 63–64. 
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analysis the trial, and appellate courts should engage in before approving use 
of Williams Rule evidence.268 
Jackson v. State269 involved an appeal from a conviction for burglary 
of a dwelling and for battery.270  The State claimed that in March 2011, 
Jackson broke into his ex-girlfriend’s apartment and attacked her with a 
knife.271  Over defense objection, the trial court allowed the State to produce 
evidence of two prior incidents to prove the defendant had the intent needed 
to commit the March 2011 crimes.272  The first incident occurred in June 
2010, when Jackson had pulled the victim from a car and attacked her.273  
The second one occurred in November 2010, when Jackson had come to the 
victim’s apartment at her invitation, but had battered her there. 274   In a 
thoughtful opinion, the First District reversed the convictions.275  The court 
acknowledged that Williams Rule evidence is admissible to prove material 
facts in a case. 276   However, it differed from the trial court as to how 
materiality should be determined.277  Just because an issue is technically an 
element of an offense does not make it automatically material for Williams 
Rule purposes.278  Instead, the issue must be a truly contested one at trial.279  
Jackson did not raise any issue of intent.280  Rather, he claimed he had never 
been at the victim’s apartment on the particular date in March and thus did 
not commit any crime there.281 
“Even if intent [had been] a [true] material issue,” the other incidents 
were not substantially similar enough to demonstrate it.282  The first incident 
did not take place at the victim’s residence, and while the second one did, 
Jackson had been invited over to the apartment. 283   Thus, while both 
incidents allegedly involved batteries, neither one of them came close to 
involving a burglary and so, were not relevant in determining if he 
                                                 
268. Jackson, 140 So. 3d at 1071–73. 
269. 140 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
270. Id. at 1069. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. at 1069–70. 
273. Id. at 1070. 
274. Jackson, 140 So. 3d at 1070. 
275. Id. at 1070–73. 
276. Id. at 1069–70. 
277. Id. at 1070–71. 
278. Id. at 1071; see also Williams, 110 So. 2d at 659. 
279. Jackson, 140 So. 3d at 1070–71. 
280. Id. at 1071. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. at 1071–72; see also McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1255 (Fla. 
2006). 
283. Jackson, 140 So. 3d at 1070. 
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committed a burglary.284  As to the battery charge, the First District found the 
other acts’ relevancy was solely based on pure propensity reasoning—he 
attacked this woman twice in the past, so that makes it more likely he 
attacked her here—which is what the Williams Rule explicitly forbids!285 
Overall, Jackson is an excellent example of the thorough analysis 
trial, and appellate courts should engage in when faced with Williams Rule 
questions.  As this type of evidence has the potential to be unfairly 
prejudicial to defendants, it should not be admitted unless its materiality is 
truly factually an issue and not just an issue in a formal legal sense. 
3. To Prove Child Molestation Charges 
Both the Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence have added special 
provisions relating to the admission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
evidence in child molestation cases.286  Section 90.404(2)(b)(1) of the Florida 
Statutes provides that in criminal child molestation cases, “evidence of the 
defendant’s commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation 
is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter for which 
it is relevant.”287  This section’s language indicates the legislature intended to 
allow what is usually not permitted in criminal case—evidence admitted 
largely for its propensity purposes.  Evidently, the legislature felt that when it 
comes to certain types of sex crimes, there is a very real risk of repeat 
offenders, so that evidence that an accused had committed an earlier sexual 
offense is strong indication he committed a later criminally charged one.  In 
McLean v. State,288 the Supreme Court of Florida held that even when this 
section merely serves “as a conduit for evidence that corroborates the 
victim’s testimony that the crime occurred rather than to prove the identity of 
the alleged perpetrator,”289 it does not violate due process.290  McLean did not 
find that evidence of prior acts of molestation was automatically admissible, 
despite the statutory wording that could be construed that way.  Instead, the 
court focused on the words “‘and may be considered for its bearing on any 
                                                 
284. Id. at 1072. 
285. Id. at 1070, 1072; see also Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 659, 661, 
663 (Fla. 1959). 
286. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2) (2014); FED. R. EVID. 414. 
287. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b)(1).  There is a similarly worded provision for 
evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” in a sexual offense charge case.  See id. § 
90.404(2)(c)(1).  The Florida Legislature passed these sections in 2001.  Act effective July 1, 
2001, ch. 2001-221, § 1, 2001 Fla. Laws 1938, 1938. 
288. 934 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2006). 
289. Id. at 1251. 
290. Id. 
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol40/iss1/5
2015] EVIDENCE:  2014 SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW 103 
matter [for] which it is relevant.’”291  When it comes to relevancy and other 
acts, relevancy must be evaluated first by how similar the other sexual acts 
are to the crime charged.292  The more similarity, the more probative they 
are.293  Likewise, the less similar, the less probative, and the more likelihood 
they will generate unfair prejudicial against an accused and should be 
excluded by section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes.294  McLean set out a four-
part test to determine admissibility of other acts of molestation.295  First, how 
similar are the other acts and the charged ones in terms of when, where, how, 
and to whom they occurred?296  Second, how close in time are the other acts 
and the ones charged?297  Third, how frequently did the other acts occur?298  
Finally, are there any intervening circumstances between the other acts and 
the ones charged?299 
Four reported opinions discussed this type of evidence in child 
sexual victim cases during the Survey period. 300   Not surprisingly, the 
appellate courts affirmed admission in three out of the four cases.301  Stewart 
v. State302 represents what is probably a typical approach to admission of this 
type of evidence.303  The accused was charged with sexually battering a 
person between twelve and eighteen years of age while he was in a position 
of familial authority.304  The State introduced proof Stewart had previously 
sexually battered his step-daughter and also his wife’s daughter, both when 
the girls were young. 305   In affirming his conviction, the First District 
described this as Williams Rule evidence even though it seems to have been 
introduced solely for its propensity. 306   The court described section 
                                                 
291. Id. at 1254. 
292. Id. 
293. McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1255. 
294. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2014); McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1256. 
295. McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1262. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. 
300. See Harrelson v. State, 146 So. 3d 171, 173 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); 
Stewart v. State, 147 So. 3d 119, 121 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Fincher v. State, 137 So. 
3d 437, 439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Peralta-Morales v. State, 143 So. 3d 483, 485 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
301. Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 175; Stewart, 147 So. 3d at 124; Fincher, 137 
So. 3d at 442; Peralta-Morales, 143 So. 3d at 486. 
302. 147 So. 3d 119 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
303. See id. at 123–24. 
304. Id. at 120; see also FLA. STAT. § 794.011(8)(b) (2014). 
305. Stewart, 147 So. 3d at 121. 
306. Id. at 123–24.  The court found it “showed an underlying pattern of 
molestation where the appellant was in a familial or custodial setting with the victims and the 
molestation occurred in the home.”  Id. at 121. 
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90.404(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes as establishing a relaxed standard of 
admissibility307 even though similarity between the charged offense and the 
past acts was still important.308  The court emphasized that similarity did not 
mean the two sets of offenses had to be identical or the same in all 
respects.309  Here, sufficient similarity to uphold admission existed because 
the victims were all underage females, the offenses all took place in the 
family home, the defendant was in a familial or custodial role each time, and 
the victims were all vulnerable due to being either asleep or under 
anesthesia.310  The fact that some of the acts involved digital penetration, and 
some involved penile penetration did not outweigh the other similarities.311 
Ironically, the only decision reversing a conviction for improper 
admission of this type of evidence also came from the First District.312  In 
Harrelson v. State,313 the appellate court reversed and remanded, for further 
proceedings, the defendant’s conviction for lewd, lascivious, or indecent 
assault on a child under sixteen.314  The victim was either the defendant’s 
daughter or step-daughter.315  Harrelson and her mother were divorced when 
the acts allegedly occurred.316  The defendant was alleged to have grabbed 
the victim’s hand and made her touch his penis during a visit to Harrelson’s 
mother’s home.317  At least some of the claimed other acts also occurred 
during other visits to Harrelson’s father’s home.318 
The State gave the defense the required notice of intent to use.319  
However, the trial court and defense undertook an unusual and ultimately 
legally reversible procedure to determine admissibility.  Defense counsel 
                                                                                                                   
Some may claim this is not propensity, but the author does not agree.  See id. at 123.  
It shows Stewart had a propensity to sexually molest young girls when he got them in the 
home.  See id. at 121.  Thus, he must have molested the young victim here.  See Stewart, 147 
So. 3d at 123–24. 
307. Id. at 123 (quoting Easterly v. State, 22 So. 3d 807, 814 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009)); FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b). 
308. Stewart, 147 So. 3d at 124. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. 
311. Id.  The other two opinions, not discussed in this Survey’s text, affirming 
admission of other acts of molestation are Fincher and Peralta-Morales.  Fincher v. State, 137 
So. 3d 437, 442 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Peralta-Morales v. State, 143 So. 3d 483, 486 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see also supra note 365 (briefly criticizing Peralta-Morales). 
312. Harrelson v. State, 146 So. 3d 171, 175 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  
Both opinions were per curiam.  Judge Rowe is the only judge named as being on both panels. 
313. 146 So. 3d 171 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
314. Id. at 172, 175. 
315. See id. at 174. 
316. Id. at 174. 
317. Id. at 173. 
318. Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 174. 
319. Id. at 173. 
32
Nova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol40/iss1/5
2015] EVIDENCE:  2014 SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW 105 
suggested the trial court should first do the required weighing under section 
90.403 of the Florida Statutes of probative value versus unfair prejudice 
before making a finding that the other acts had been proven by clear and 
convincing evidence.320  The trial judge did so and ruled the substantial 
similarity between the alleged offenses outweighed any potential 
prejudice.321  The trial court then concluded that no finding of clear and 
convincing evidence was needed as the other crimes involved the same 
victim, the same conduct, and the same approximate timeframe as the 
charged offense.322  The defense cross-examined the victim about the other 
acts and also called Harrelson’s mother as a defense witness.323  She testified 
some of the furniture supposedly in the home at the time was gone by then, 
all in an effort to dispute the acts’ existence.324 
In a brief opinion, the First District reversed.325  The court ruled that 
findings that other crimes, wrongs, or acts exist by a clear and convincing 
evidence standard are legally mandated in all cases.326  The fact that the 
alleged other crimes involved the same, instead of different, victims did not 
change this requirement.327  As the defense had at trial denied their existence 
with strong proof, the court could not say there was not a strong possibility 
this evidence did not influence the jury.328  However, a new trial was not 
necessarily required.329  As the trial court had already done the required 
section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes balancing, only a hearing to see if the 
State could meet the clear and convincing evidence standard was required.330  
If so, the conviction should have been re-instated.331  If not, a new trial was 
necessary.332 
Harrelson is important because it emphasizes to both counsel and 
trial courts the importance of following the complete procedure discussed in 
McLean for determining the admissibility of other acts of child molestation.  
Also, as McLean has been cited as requiring clear and convincing proof for 
any Williams Rule evidence, this multi-step procedure should be strictly 
                                                 
320. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2014). 
321. Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 173. 
322. Id. 
323. Id. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. at 175. 
326. Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 173. 
327. Id. at 173–74. 
328. Id. at 174. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. at 174–75; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2014). 
331. Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 175. 
332. Id. 
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followed for all evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts no matter what the 
offense charged. 
IV. WITNESS EXAMINATION ISSUES 
Witness examination issues can arise in any number of ways.  
During this Survey period, one case provided the factual background for the 
Supreme Court of Florida’s discussion of several of them. 333   The 
prosecution in Wilcox v. State334  charged the defendant with first-degree 
murder, armed kidnaping, and armed robbery.335   Wilcox had called his 
cousin, Richaundu Curry, and asked if he could stay at her Lauderhill 
townhome. 336   Curry shared her home with her brother, her sister, and 
Curry’s ex-boyfriend.337  The four of them lived next to the victim, Nimoy 
Johnson. 338   The day Wilcox arrived, someone burglarized Johnson’s 
home. 339   Johnson initially blamed it on someone living in Curry’s 
townhome, and the two of them had words about this.340  After Curry had 
assured Johnson they were good neighbors, he apologized, and everything 
seemed fine.341  About one week later, an intruder came to Johnson’s home, 
and got him to call three female friends of his to come over.342  The intruder 
had Johnson tie up the three women and then took Johnson from the room 
they were in.343  Later that evening, someone stole one of the women’s car.344  
After they had freed themselves, they found Johnson shot dead in his 
home.345  Eyewitness testimony placed Wilcox around Johnson’s home at the 
time of the kidnapping and murder.346  Besides this, DNA evidence linked 
him to a cigarette the intruder had smoked in the home.347  Wilcox had even 
admitted that morning in a phone call to Curry’s brother that he had killed 
                                                 
333. See Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 366–71 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 1406 (2015). 
334. 143 So. 3d 359 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1406 (2015). 
335. See id. at 369. 
336. Id. at 366. 
337. Id. 
338. Id. 
339. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 366. 
340. Id. 
341. Id. 
342. Id. 
343. Id. at 367. 
344. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 368. 
345. Id. 
346. See id. at 367–68. 
347. Id. at 369. 
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Johnson the night before or earlier that same morning. 348  Abundant other 
evidence linked Wilcox to the charged crimes.349 
At trial, Wilcox claimed he did not perpetrate these crimes.350  He 
claimed never to have been to the county where the crimes took place and 
claimed he was in a neighboring county that weekend. 351  Wilcox was 
arrested at an apartment complex where the stolen car was found but claimed 
Curry’s brother gave it to him three days after the crimes.352  At the guilt 
phase, Wilcox represented himself, with standby counsel appointed for his 
assistance if Wilcox wished to ask for help. 353   This self-representation 
decision led to several evidentiary issues discussed below. 
A. Refreshing Recollection 
Sometimes witnesses forget for various reasons and need help in 
remembering so they can give or continue giving testimony.  The process of 
doing this is called refreshing recollection.354  Although this process is not 
laid out in statute or rules, it is so common that questions about it seldom 
arise.  To prove its case against Wilcox, the State called his cousin, 
Richaunda Curry, whose home was next to the victim’s home.355  Curry 
testified that in a second police interview after the crimes, detectives had 
asked her if she knew someone with gold teeth.356  She had not yet told 
police about her cousin, Wilcox because she did want to tell them she 
believed he was involved in the crimes.357  When she learned police were 
looking for someone with gold teeth, she felt comfortable telling them about 
Wilcox and his gold teeth.358  On cross-examination by Wilcox, she denied 
knowing anyone else with gold teeth, including her sister or her sister’s 
                                                 
348. Id. at 368. 
349. See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 368–71. 
350. See id. at 369. 
351. Id. at 369. 
352. Id. at 368–69. 
353. Id. at 369, 373. 
354. See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 378.  Some jurisdictions may alternatively call 
this refreshing memory, but the concept is the same.  E.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.613.  Both the Code 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence imply this process is available, although neither one 
directly says so.  See id.; FED. R. EVID. 612.  Certainly, a trial judge’s inherent power to 
control proceedings under section 90.612(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes to “[f]acilitate, through 
effective interrogation and presentation, the discovery of . . . truth” permits judges to allow 
this.  FLA. STAT. § 90.612(1)(a).  Also, the existence of section 90.613 of the Florida Statutes, 
Refreshing the Memory of a Witness, implies this.  See id. § 90.613. 
355. See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 375. 
356. Id. at 377. 
357. Id. 
358. Id. 
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boyfriend.359  Specifically, Curry testified in response to a question from 
Wilcox that “[you are] the only one that got gold teeth, that I know of.”360  
After another question and brief answer, Wilcox asked, “[c]an I refresh your 
memory, please?”361  The State objected to lack of a proper foundation to 
refresh recollection, and the judge told Wilcox to rephrase his question.362  
Wilcox then asked “do you think any document . . . would refresh your 
memory as to who all had gold that was at your respective apartment?”363  
After Curry said probably, the State again objected, but the judge let Wilcox 
proceed.364 
Up to now, one cannot hardly find fault with the proceedings on this 
point.  Technically speaking, there may not have been an absolute need to 
refresh recollection, but the judge acted wisely in giving a pro se defendant, 
especially one in a capital case, leeway.  What happened next provoked 
error, although the Supreme Court of Florida found all trial errors harmless 
given the overwhelming proof against Wilcox.365 
Wilcox then tried to refresh Curry’s memory by using the statement 
of another witness, Jean, which was summarized in and attached to the 
affidavit for his arrest.366  According to the summary, Jean was the victim’s 
friend and had talked with Johnson about a week before the charged 
crimes.367  The summary claimed Johnson told Jean about confronting two 
people, one of whom had gold teeth, regarding Johnson’s home being 
burglarized.368  The man with gold teeth allegedly told Johnson he was not 
afraid of Johnson, and Johnson had allegedly threatened to shoot him.369  The 
                                                 
359. Id. 
360. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 377. 
361. Id. 
362. Id. at 377–78.  Technically, it seems that the State’s proper objection was 
lack of a predicate to refresh recollection.  See id.  Curry never said she could not remember 
whom else she knew who had gold teeth or that she was not sure if she knew someone else 
with gold teeth.  Id. at 377. 
Lawyers are not entitled to refresh recollection any time they get an answer they 
may not like or expect.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.613 (2014).  There must be a need to do so 
caused by a witness’s complete or partial inability to recall.  See id. 
At common law, a witness had to have complete memory failure about a matter.  
See NLRB v. Fed. Dairy Co., 297 F.2d 487, 488–89 (1st Cir. 1962).  This is not required by 
the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Code.  See FED. R. EVID. 612; FLA. STAT. § 90.613. 
363. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 377. 
364. Id. at 377–78. 
365. Id. at 378–79. 
366. Id. 
367. Id. 
368. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 378. 
369. Id. 
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prosecutor objected to Curry being refreshed by Jean’s statement, and the 
trial court refused to let Wilcox use the document to do so.370 
The Supreme Court of Florida found error in this ruling.371  When a 
witness needs his or her memory refreshed, “a party may show the witness a 
writing or other object to attempt to refresh . . . recollection.”372  If a writing 
is being used to refresh, it does not have to be one actually written by the 
witness.373  Nor does it have to be otherwise admissible into evidence.374  
The witness should not be allowed to read parts of the writing aloud, nor 
should the questioning attorney do so, as that would cause potential hearsay 
issues. 375   If the witness’s memory is successfully refreshed, and the 
witness’s testimony is based on remembering an event, not on remembering 
the contents of whatever is shown to the witness, “that which prompted the 
witness’s memory is immaterial.”376  Thus, Wilcox should have been allowed 
to use the arrest affidavit summary to refresh Curry’s memory, if it could. 
B. Impeachment with Prior Convictions 
Section 90.608 of the Florida Statutes recognizes that any party may 
impeach a witness and that there are multiple ways of doing so.377  One 
standard method of impeaching a witness’s credibility is by showing the 
witness has committed certain crimes that theoretically cast doubt on the 
witness’s ability to tell the truth.378  Section 90.610(1) of the Florida Statutes 
limits these crimes to ones “punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of [one] year” in the jurisdiction of conviction 379  or ones that involved 
“dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment.”380 
                                                 
370. Id.  The court also refused to let Wilcox use the summary to impeach 
Curry.  Id. 
371. Id. 
372. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 378. 
373. Garrett v. Morris Kirschman & Co., 336 So. 2d 566, 569 (Fla. 1976). 
374. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 379; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.613 (2014). 
375. See Garrett, 336 So. 2d at 569. 
376. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 378.  Sometimes the witness’s memory of the 
underlying event or fact is not truly refreshed.  See K.E.A. v. State, 802 So. 2d 410, 411 (Fla. 
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).  Rather what the witness has used as the basis for his or her 
subsequent testimony is what has been just shown to the witness.  See id.  When opposing 
counsel suspects this is the case, section 90.613 of the Florida Statutes requires that the item 
used to refresh recollection be produced so opposing counsel can use it to demonstrate this 
continued memory failure.  FLA. STAT. § 90.613. 
377. Id. § 90.608. 
378. Id. § 90.610. 
379. Id. § 90.610(1).  These are commonly called felonies, as the quoted 
language is the standard definition for a felony at common law.  See id. § 90.610; State v. 
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While section 90.610 of the Florida Statutes sets out what general 
crimes qualify for impeachment, case law has delineated the proper 
procedure for doing so.  The questioning attorney should ask, “have you ever 
been convicted of a felony or a crime involving dishonesty [or false 
statement]?”381  If the witness admits committing crimes of these types, then 
the questioner is limited to asking either, if so, how many?  Or just how 
many?382  If the witness answers both questions accurately, further questions 
about the witness’ criminal record should not be asked; at least not for 
purposes of impeaching by a prior conviction.383 
In the Wilcox case described above, problems also arose about the 
proper way of doing this type of impeachment. 384   Wilcox testified and 
denied his involvement in the murder, kidnappings, and robbery.385   On 
cross-examination the prosecutor asked him:  “[H]ave you been previously 
convicted of a felony or crime involving dishonestly?”386   After a short 
exchange between the two, Wilcox admitted, “I have been convicted of a 
crime.”387  When again asked if he had been convicted of a felony or crime 
involving dishonesty, Wilcox replied saying, “[g]ot to make me understand.  
As far as dishonesty is concerned, I do [not] see where I lied about 
anything.”388  The prosecutor told him it was not the state’s job to make him 
understand and asked for the third time about felonies or crimes of 
dishonesty.389  Wilcox replied by saying, “I got to say no.”390 
The prosecutor responded by inquiring if Wilcox had been convicted 
of second degree murder, armed robbery, and grand theft motor vehicle.391  
Wilcox admitted he had, but added it was as an accomplice. 392   The 
                                                                                                                   
Page, 449 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1984).  However, some jurisdictions recognize aggravated 
misdemeanors that are punishable by more than one year. 
380. FLA. STAT. § 90.610(1). 
381. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 372. 
382. Id. at 372–74. 
383. Id. at 374; FLA. STAT. § 90.610.  This describes how impeachment by 
prior convictions should proceed when the person being impeached is an actual witness.  See 
FLA. STAT. § 90.610.  For discussion of the proper procedure for impeaching a hearsay 
declarant, see infra Section IV.D. 
384. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 374. 
385. Id. at 371–72. 
386. Id. at 371.  Note how even this question is not technically in the correct 
form as it omitted any reference to crimes of false statement.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.610.  
However, this omission had nothing to do with the subsequent erroneous cross-examination.  
See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 374. 
387. Id. at 372. 
388. Id. 
389. Id. 
390. Id. 
391. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 372. 
392. Id. 
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prosecutor then asked Wilcox about each crime in turn and whether he 
considered that type crime to be a crime of dishonesty or dishonest, 
beginning with the theft conviction and ending with the second degree 
murder conviction.393 
The defendant argued that allowing the State to impeach him by 
mentioning his specific crimes was improper, because the prosecutor had to 
exploit his confusion about the questions to do so.394  In turn, the State 
argued Wilcox was being cagey395 and wrongfully tried to resist answering 
the State’s questions.396  Additionally, the State argued this issue had not 
been preserved for appeal by a contemporaneous objection.397 
The Supreme Court of Florida partially agreed with both sides.398  
The Court found that Wilcox was genuinely confused by the questioning 
itself when he said, “[you] [g]ot to make me understand” that he may have 
been confused about the proper way to object to the cross-examination and 
that the trial court was aware of this confusion.399  As there was no indication 
Wilcox did not fail to object to gain a tactical advantage; and also with the 
leeway pro se defendants should be given, the Court found the claim of error 
preserved.400 
As to the merits of Wilcox’s claim, the Court found that the trial 
judge did not abuse his discretion in letting the State initially inquire about 
Wilcox’s criminal record for the three convictions.401  The convictions were 
all felonies, thus permissible for impeachment.402  Besides this, Wilcox was 
given several chances to ask for help from standby counsel but did not do 
so.403  Although he truthfully said one time that he had been convicted of a 
crime, he had also twice explicitly said no when asked about this.404  Thus, 
the State was entitled to clear this up at trial.405 
However, even with this entitlement, the State’s follow up questions 
about whether Wilcox considered certain of the felonies crimes of dishonesty 
                                                 
393. Id. 
394. Id. 
395. Id. 
396. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 372. 
397. Id. 
398. Id. at 373–74. 
399. Id. at 372–73. 
400. Id. at 373. 
401. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 373–74. 
402. Id. at 374. 
403. Id. at 373. 
404. Id. at 372–73. 
405. Id. at 373–74.  The Supreme Court may have found that Wilcox likely 
was, or at least probably was, partially lying at trial.  See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 372.  The 
Court declared that “[a] reasonable person could conclude that Wilcox was being, as the State 
contends, cagey with his responses to the prosecutor’s questions.”  Id. at 373. 
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was erroneous.406  Once the State was able to show he had a past criminal 
record of certain type felonies, questioning about them should have 
stopped.407  Florida law recognizes that some crimes involve dishonesty or 
false statement and some do not.408  However, this distinction is important 
for impeachment purposes only when the crimes are misdemeanors, not 
felonies.409  Since any felony can be used to impeach under section 90.610(1) 
of the Florida Statutes, whether the felony additionally involved dishonesty 
was irrelevant.410  What the prosecution tried to do here was to get double 
mileage from the same felony conviction.411  The Supreme Court of Florida 
concisely summed up its ruling on this point.  After a witness’s prior 
convictions are displayed by name and number before a jury, “the 
prosecution may not then continue to question the witness regarding whether 
his or her prior felony convictions are also crimes of dishonesty.”412 
The prosecution’s impeachment by prior convictions was also 
incorrect for other points not discussed by the Court.  First, robbery and 
motor vehicle theft are crimes of dishonesty under Florida law.  Second, 
none of the prosecutor’s questions about the crimes being ones of dishonesty 
ever should have been allowed for another reason.  The questions asking 
whether Wilcox considered certain crimes to involve dishonesty asked for 
Wilcox’s opinions about what he had done in the past.413  This is irrelevant 
for prior conviction impeachment purposes.  What should count is not what 
Wilcox felt about his crimes being ones of dishonesty, but whether as a 
matter of Florida law, they were.  Both the prosecutor and trial judge seem to 
have ignored this distinction, and the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion 
surprisingly fails to comment on it. 
Even with these additional errors, the Supreme Court of Florida’s 
finding of harmless error is easily defensible given the apparent 
overwhelming evidence of Wilcox’s guilt and lack of credibility.414 
C. Inappropriate Witness Dress in Criminal Cases 
The next witness examination issue does not involve actual witness 
questioning. 
                                                 
406. Id. at 374. 
407. Id. 
408. See State v. Page, 449 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1984). 
409. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 374. 
410. Id. at 374; FLA. STAT. § 90.610(1) (2014). 
411. See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 374. 
412. Id. 
413. Id. at 372, 374. 
414. See id. at 374−75. 
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Hopefully, it also arises so rarely that seeing a case having to discuss 
it is surprising indeed.  Finally, the fact that the issue could have been easily 
avoided by the use of good judgment is especially disappointing since it led 
to reversible error.415 
In Hayes v. State,416 the State claimed the defendant and another man 
committed armed robbery and assault against a single victim.417  Hayes was 
tried alone.418  The victim identified Hayes at trial, and the jury was not told 
if the second person had ever been caught.419  The robbery took place in the 
front yard of a man named Pharory Greene.420  Greene appeared as a defense 
witness, claimed that he saw the robbery take place, and that Hayes was not 
one of the perpetrators.421 
The problem was not with what Greene said but how he had to say it.  
Greene, at the time of Hayes’s trial, was incarcerated in the jail for an 
unnamed offense.422  The offense apparently had no connection with the 
robbery on trial.  Greene, over defense objections, had to testify wearing jail 
clothes.423  Days before the trial, defense counsel had brought clothes to the 
jail for Greene to change into before taking the stand.424  When Greene was 
brought to court in jail garb, defense counsel objected to this.425  He argued 
that the State would not ordinarily be permitted to cross-examine the witness 
about his incarceration;426 but that once Greene appeared in jail clothes, his 
prisoner status would be obvious.427  The trial court overruled this objection 
stating, “‘[w]e [do not] dress out witnesses’” no matter whom they would 
testify for. 428   Counsel also argued the jury would think Greene was a 
codefendant, while he in fact was not.429  The defense wanted to bring this 
out but declined to do so when the trial judge said it would open up Greene 
                                                 
415. Id. at 1108−09. 
416. 140 So. 3d 1106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
417. Id. at 1107. 
418. See id. 
419. Id. 
420. Id. 
421. Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1108. 
422. Id. at 1107. 
423. Id. at 1107−08. 
424. Id. 
425. Id. at 1107. 
426. Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1107.  The opinion never mentions the exact offense 
for which Greene was jailed.  See id. at 1107–08.  However, it was obviously one that was 
unavailable for impeachment by prior conviction under section 90.610(1) of the Florida 
Statutes.  See id. at 1107; FLA. STAT. § 90.610(1) (2014). 
427. Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1107. 
428. Id. (first alteration in original). 
429. Id. 
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to inquiry about his criminal history.430  Greene ultimately testified in jail 
clothes, and the jury never heard he was not a codefendant to the robbery 
charge.431 
In a short but well-reasoned opinion, the First District reversed and 
remanded for a new trial.432  The court first discussed the prohibition against 
forcing a defendant to testify in jail clothing.433  To do so would violate 
several of an accused’s fundamental rights.434  First, it would violate his 
presumption of innocence.435  Secondly, it would also violate his right to 
equal protection of the law as forcing defendants to testify in jail clothes 
would usually only affect those who could not make bail before trial.436 
As to forcing a defense witness to testify dressed in jail clothes, only 
the Second District Court of Appeal had previously addressed this issue.437  
In Mullins v. State,438 the court found such to be error as it could have an 
indirect effect on the accused’s presumption of innocence.439  Witnesses do 
not have the same presumption of innocence as defendants, but defendants 
should not be exposed to the dangers of guilt by association or to having 
their witness’s credibility unfairly undermined by matters that would be 
otherwise unusable for impeachment.440 
The First District agreed with this reasoning and noted that courts 
from other states agreed with it as well.441  Hayes also commented that at 
least one other state court had found that forcing a defense witness to testify 
in jail clothes generally “‘further[s] no vital State interest.’”442  The First 
District recognized there could be unusual situations when safety concerns or 
other circumstances justified requiring witnesses to testify in jail clothes or 
even physical restraints.443  But this was not the case here.444  Instead, it 
                                                 
430. Id. at 1107–08. 
431. Id. at 1108. 
432. Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1108–09. 
433. Id. at 1108. 
434. Id. 
435. Id. 
436. Id. 
437. See Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1108; Mullins v. State, 766 So. 2d 1136, 1136 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
438. 766 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
439. Id. at 1137. 
440. See id. 
441. Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1108. 
442. Id. (quoting State v. Artwell, 832 A.2d 295, 303 (N.J. 2003)). 
443. Id. at 1109. 
444. Id. 
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seemed that it was merely “not the common practice”445 for this judge to let 
prisoner witnesses’ change into civilian clothes before testifying.446 
The appellate court refused to find harmless error. 447   Greene’s 
testimony that Hayes was not one of the robbers was critical to Hayes’s 
defense; thus, anything detracting from Greene’s credibility could hurt 
this.448  The court thus could not say there was “‘no reasonable possibility 
that the error contributed to the conviction.’”449 
Three things in general should happen as a result of this decision.  
First, this practice should be stopped.  Indeed, it is almost inconceivable that 
it happened in the first place.  Perhaps, the First District’s opinion should be 
required reading for newly elected or appointed judges when they attend 
judge school.  Second, defense counsel should be alert, like the one here, to 
object to this when it might take place.  Finally, prosecutors should also try 
to prevent such errors from taking place.  Prosecutors have an ethical 
obligation to seek justice and not just try to get convictions at all cost.450  
Additionally, why would any smart prosecutor want this to happen when it 
might easily lead to reversible error like it did here?  In fairness to the State 
in this case, there is no mention of the State ever objecting to Greene 
testifying in civilian clothes or objecting to a short continuance while he 
changed.  In the future, prosecutors should join with defense counsel to see 
that this scenario is never repeated. 
D. Impeaching a Hearsay Declarant 
Occasionally, statements from someone who does not actually testify 
get admitted as substantive proof.451  If offered for their truth, the statements 
are hearsay.452  When this happens, section 90.806(1) of the Florida Statutes 
provides in part that the declarant’s credibility “may be attacked . . . by any 
evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had 
testified as a witness.”453  Cases construing this provision seldom arise for 
                                                 
445. Id. 
446. Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1109. 
447. Id. 
448. See id. at 1107–09. 
449. Id. at 1109 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986)). 
450. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 
2013). 
451. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c) (2014). 
452. Id. 
453. Id. § 90.806(1).  This subsection also provides that if so attacked, the 
declarant’s credibility “may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those 
purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.”  Id. 
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various reasons.454  First, it is more persuasive to rely on testimony from 
actual witnesses than from someone’s statement about what someone else 
said.455   Second, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause acts as a 
partial check on admission of some hearsay from unavailable declarants.456 
One instance where counsel may try to admit hearsay from 
unavailable declarants involves defendants who want their exculpatory out-
of-court statements admitted without their having to testify and be fully 
cross-examined.457  Provisions of section 90.806(1) of the Florida Statutes 
stand as a partial obstacle for those defendants who wish to have their cake 
and eat it too by doing this.458  One 2014 case illustrates both the danger to 
the criminally accused in trying to do so and also sets parameters on the 
extent of the State’s ability to impeach hearsay declarants.459 
In Mathis v. State,460 the State charged James Mathis with possession 
of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia.461  The drugs were found 
when the police executed a search warrant at Mathis’ residence.462  He was 
home and arrested after the drugs were found.463  On cross-examination, a 
police officer admitted talking with Mathis the day of the arrest.464  The 
officer conceded Mathis never made any admissions during their 
conversation.465  The trial court, on the State’s request, ruled the defense had 
introduced exculpatory testimony during the cross-examination, thus 
entitling the State to introduce copies of Mathis’ eight felony convictions and 
one misdemeanor conviction for a crime of dishonesty.466  The State did so, 
and Mathis was convicted.467 
On appeal, Mathis argued the officer’s cross-examination testimony 
was not exculpatory.468  The Second District disagreed as the conversation 
established Mathis “presumably denied . . . the drugs belonged to him.”469  
                                                 
454. See FLA. STAT. § 90.806; 1 EHRHARDT, supra note 21, at § 801.1. 
455. See 1 EHRHARDT, supra note 21, at § 801.1. 
456. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FLA. STAT. § 90.806. 
457. See Freeman v. State, 74 So. 3d 123, 125 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
458. See FLA. STAT. § 90.806(1). 
459. Mathis v. State, 135 So. 3d 484, 485 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
460. 135 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
461. Id. at 485. 
462. Id. 
463. Id. 
464. Id. 
465. Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 485. 
466. Id. 
467. Id. 
468. Id. 
469. Id.  This ruling seems undoubtedly correct.  Why would the defense have 
asked the question involved if not to elicit exculpatory testimony? 
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Thus, the State could impeach him by prior convictions.470  However, the 
appellate court agreed the State’s actual impeachment of Mathis went too 
far.471  While the State was entitled to impeach Mathis with his past criminal 
record, it was not automatically entitled to introduce copies of the prior 
convictions themselves. 472   Had Mathis taken the stand and testified, he 
could have been impeached by prior conviction under section 90.610 of the 
Florida Statutes.473  Under this rule, the State could have asked Mathis if he 
had ever been convicted of a felony or any crimes involving dishonesty or 
false statements.474  If Mathis had said yes, the State would then have been 
allowed to ask him how many? or how many times?475  If Mathis had given 
accurate answers to both questions, further interrogation on his prior 
convictions would have been disallowed.476  The State would only have been 
able to introduce copies of his prior convictions if Mathis had answered 
untruthfully to one of the two previous answers.477 
In Huggins v. State, 478  the Supreme Court of Florida permitted 
introduction of a defendant’s prior convictions after he elicited his own 
statements as favorable hearsay but limited the procedure for doing so.479  
The trial court told the jury of the number of the accused’s convictions and 
whether they were for felonies or for crimes of dishonesty or false 
statement.480  The trial court also gave a special limiting instruction on the 
permissible use of the convictions.481  The names of the convictions were 
never mentioned.482  After Huggins, in Freeman v. State,483 the district court 
of appeal suggested an added procedure.484  The trial court should wait until 
the defense rests before deciding on a state’s request to impeach a hearsay 
declarant.485  If the declarant testified later at trial, then cross-examination 
                                                 
470. Id. 
471. Id. 
472. Id. at 485–86. 
473. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.610 (2014). 
474. Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 485–86; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.610. 
475. Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 487. 
476. Id. at 486–87. 
477. Id. at 487. 
478. 889 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2004). 
479. Id. at 755–56. 
480. Id. at 754. 
481. Id. 
482. Id. at 756–57. 
483. 74 So. 3d 123 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
484. See Huggins, 889 So. 2d at 755–57; Freeman, 74 So. 3d at 125. 
485. Freeman, 74 So. 3d at 125. 
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could proceed according to the usual procedure.486  If not, the impeachment 
would follow as Huggins discussed.487 
The trial court in Mathis followed neither procedure.488  It did not 
wait to see if Mathis would ultimately testify.489  It also did not give a 
cautionary jury instruction to use Mathis’ prior convictions only to evaluate 
the credibility of his out-of-court statements and not as substantive proof of 
guilt, which would have been improper propensity use of the convictions.490  
Finally, it improperly admitted copies of the convictions, thus allowing the 
jury to see the exact crimes he was convicted for.491  The Second District 
declined to find these errors were harmless.492  Only one witness said the 
drugs were Mathis’, and her own credibility was in question because of her 
prior convictions.493 
V. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
The privilege for attorney-client confidential communications is 
recognized by all states and by federal case law as well.494  Section 90.502(2) 
of the Florida Statutes provides that “[a] client has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing the contents of 
confidential communications when such other person learned of the 
                                                 
486. Id. 
487. Id.; Huggins, 889 So. 2d at 755–57. 
488. Mathis v. State, 135 So. 3d 484, 486 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see 
also Huggins, 889 So. 2d at 755–57; Freeman, 74 So. 3d at 125. 
489. Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 486–87. 
490. Id.  The cautionary instruction in Freeman is a good example of what the 
jurors should have been told.  Id. at 486; see also Freeman, 74 So. 3d at 125.  “[E]vidence of 
prior convictions should be considered only for the purpose of assessing the defendant’s 
credibility of statements he allegedly made that were related by a witness and are not to be 
considered as proof of guilt for the charged offense.”  Freeman, 74 So. 3d. at 125. 
491. Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 485.  The court’s opinion does not say whether this 
happened, but if the copies had been allowed back into the jury room during deliberations, this 
would have been further error.  See id. at 485–87. 
492. See id. at 487. 
493. Id. at 487. 
494. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. 1995).  
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 recognizes several general types of privileges:  Those 
recognized at common law; those in the U.S. Constitution; those created by federal statute; 
and those created by the rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.  FED. R. EVID. 501.  
When a common law version of a privilege conflicts with any of the latter three types, the 
common law version gives way.  Id. 
The attorney-client privilege has long been recognized as existing at common law 
and thus, continues to exist under federal case law.  See id. 501, 502.  Federal Rule of 
Evidence 502 specifically discusses waiver limitations and inadvertent disclosure of material 
otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege and its closely related common law 
cousin, work product.  Id. 502. 
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communications because they were made in the rendition of legal services to 
the client.”495   Cases on the privilege decided during this Survey period 
seemed to fall within two main areas.496  They involved questions about the 
privilege’s scope and its waiver, or about the crime-fraud exception to the 
privilege.497  Each of these areas deserves brief discussion.498 
A. Scope and Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege 
The privilege does not protect all interchange of information 
between clients and their lawyers, only those communications that are 
considered confidential and made to get or give legal advice.499  Florida law 
places the burden on the party claiming the privilege to show it exists and 
also to show it has not been waived.500  During this Survey period, Florida 
courts found the following protected by the privilege:  fee arrangements 
between clients and their attorneys,501 billing records between clients and 
attorneys,502  and original draft responses to interrogatories sent from the 
client to her attorney.503  However, information that would not be protected 
in a client’s possession does not become protected by transfer to an 
attorney.504  Thus, trust account wire receipts reflecting payments into a law 
firm’s trust accounts after judgment was obtained against a judgment debtor 
are not protected by the privilege.505 
As with other privileges, the one for attorney-client communications 
can be waived. 506   This may be done by answering questions at a 
                                                 
495. FLA. STAT. § 90.502(2) (2014). 
496. See Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 1064, 
1065–66 (Fla. 2011), review denied, 157 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 2014); Merco Grp. of the Palm 
Beaches, Inc. v. McGregor, 162 So. 3d 49, 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); RC/PB, Inc. v. 
Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 132 So. 3d 325, 326 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); infra Sections 
V.A–V.B. 
497. See Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1065–66; McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 50; RC/PB, 
Inc., 132 So. 3d at 326; infra Sections V.A–V.B. 
498. See infra Sections V.A–V.B. 
499. See FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1)(c)(1). 
500. RC/PB, Inc., 132 So. 3d at 326. 
501. Tumelaire v. Naples Estates Homeowners Ass’n, 137 So. 3d 596, 598 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
502. Id. at 599. 
503. See Montanez v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 135 So. 3d 510, 512 (Fla. 5th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
504. See Sweetapple Broeker & Varkas, P.L. v. Simmons, 151 So. 3d 42, 43 
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
505. Id. 
506. See FLA. STAT. § 90.507 (2014) (discussing waiver in general for all 
privileges); infra Part VI (discussing waiver of the psychotherapist-privilege). 
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deposition507 or by using the communications as the basis for arguments or 
answering questions at a hearing.508 
One recent case concerning the privilege’s scope in bad faith tort 
actions is worthy of discussion.509  Insurance companies owe a duty of good 
faith to their insureds in defending them in lawsuits.510  The companies also 
owe a duty of good faith to the plaintiffs bringing such lawsuit to process the 
plaintiffs’ claims in a reasonable manner.511  When a plaintiff is awarded a 
judgment against an insured in excess of the insured’s policy limits, both 
first-party and third-party bad faith actions against the company become a 
possibility.512 
Boozer v. Stalley 513  involved the following factual background.  
Benjamin Hintz was severely injured in a motor vehicle accident involving 
Emily Boozer.514  Boozer was covered by two Allstate policies totaling $1.1 
million coverage.515   Douglas Stalley, Hintz’s guardian, sued Boozer for 
negligence and recovered a $11.1 million verdict.516  Allstate paid its policy 
limits exposure, leaving $10 million unsatisfied. 517   Virgil Wright, an 
attorney, had been retained to defend Boozer.518  When Stalley filed a third-
party bad faith action against Allstate to collect the unsatisfied balance, 
Wright continued to appear on Boozer’s behalf in the post judgment 
proceedings.519  Stalley wished to both depose Wright and to subpoena his 
files in the underlying negligence action.520  Wright moved for a protective 
order, asserting attorney-client privilege. 521   Wright argued that 
communications between he and Boozer were privilege protected and that 
she had not assigned any first-party bad faith claim she might have against 
                                                 
507. See Montanez, 135 So. 3d at 512.  However, here, the court found the 
actual answers did not constitute a waiver.  Id. at 512–13. 
508. See Butler v. Harter, 152 So. 3d 705, 713–14 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2014).  Here, the court found that an attorney’s affidavit merely listing the number of hours 
worked on a case and the fees incurred did not disclose privileged information.  Id. at 714. 
509. Boozer v. Stalley, 146 So. 3d 139, 140 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (en 
banc). 
510. Id. at 143. 
511. Id. at 143–44, 44 n.1. 
512. Id. at 142. 
513. 146 So. 3d 139 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (en banc). 
514. Id. at 139. 
515. Id. 
516. Id. 
517. Id. 
518. Boozer, 146 So. 3d at 141. 
519. Id. 
520. Id. 
521. Id. 
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Allstate to Stalley.522  Wright appeared at a deposition with his litigation 
file.523  He answered general questions about his case management system 
and also about how his files were organized.524  He refused to answer any 
questions or produce documents relating to his direct representation of 
Boozer. 525   Both Wright and Boozer petitioned for a writ of certiorari 
claiming the trial court erred by not granting them a protective order.526  
Stalley responded that since he had filed a third party action, he stood in 
Boozer’s shoes and should be able to obtain any communications that would 
be available to her as a client.527 
After deciding that certiorari review was an appropriate means to 
address the legal issues here, the Fifth District Court of Appeal undertook an 
extensive review of the law in this area.528  Boston Old Colony Insurance Co. 
v. Gutierrez529 was deemed the first modern decision to consider whether an 
attorney representing both an insured and an insurer could be deposed and 
required to produce a litigation file in a third-party bad faith action brought 
without an assignment of claim from the insured.530  There, the court found 
the plaintiff was entitled to the insured’s attorney’s entire file from the 
lawsuit’s start until the date judgment was entered in the underlying 
action.531  This was so because the excess judgment creditor now stood in the 
position of the insured as far as bringing a bad faith action.532  Following 
Gutierrez, the Fifth District in Dunn v. National Security Fire & Casualty 
Co.,533 had rejected claims of both work product and attorney-client privilege 
protection against disclosure of original litigation files in third party bad faith 
actions.534 
In Boozer, the Fifth District acknowledged both those decisions 
supported the trial court’s ruling that Stalley should be able to review parts of 
Wright’s litigation file and to depose him about his representation of her.535  
However, the Court found two subsequent Supreme Court decisions left the 
                                                 
522. Id. 
523. Boozer, 146 So. 3d at 141. 
524. Id. 
525. Id. 
526. Id. 
527. Id. 
528. Boozer, 146 So. 3d at 141–48. 
529. 325 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). 
530. Id. at 416–17. 
531. Id. at 417. 
532. Id. 
533. 631 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
534. Id. at 1105; see also Gutierrez, 325 So. 2d at 417. 
535. Boozer v. Stalley, 146 So. 3d 139, 139, 140, 142, 147–48 (Fla. 5th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014) (en banc). 
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holdings in Gutierrez and Dunn in question.536  Allstate Indemnity Co. v. 
Ruiz, 537  had held that in statutory first-party bad faith actions, 538  work 
product material was discoverable depending upon whether the requesting 
party could show both a need for such and substantial hardship unless it is 
able to do so.539  In so doing, the court refused to draw any distinction for 
discovery purposes between first-party and third-party bad faith actions.540 
The Fifth District found Ruiz’s possible impact potentially countered 
by the Supreme Court of Florida’s later holding in Genovese v. Provident 
Life & Accident Insurance Co.,541 a first-party bad faith action case that 
refused to extend Ruiz’s holding to discovery issues involving attorney-client 
privileged communications.542  Genovese noted a clear distinction between 
the purposes behind each privilege.543  The work product privilege exists to 
protect an attorney’s efforts to prepare, bring and defend litigation. 544  
However, it can be overcome in circumstances of need and hardship.545  The 
attorney-client privilege exists to foster open communications in the 
attorney-client relationship.546   Unlike work product, claims of need and 
hardship are not sufficient to abrogate this privilege. 547   As there is no 
statutory exception for disclosure of this privilege’s protected 
communications in first-party bad faith actions, the privilege protected 
communications between an insurer and its attorney in these cases.548 
The Fifth District noted that the certified question in Genovese was 
limited to first-party action cases.549  However, Boozer examined cases from 
Florida’s state550 and federal courts551 that found the same result should be 
                                                 
536. Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 1064, 1069 
(Fla. 2011), review denied, 157 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 2014); Allstate Indem. Co. v. Ruiz, 899 So. 
2d 1121–22 (Fla. 2005); see also Gutierrez, 325 So. 2d at 417; Dunn, 631 So. 2d at 1105. 
537. 899 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2005). 
538. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1)(b)(1) (2002). 
539. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d at 1122. 
540. Id. at 1131. Ruiz contains a helpful discussion on the evolution of third-
party and first-party actions in Florida.  Id. at 1129. 
541. 74 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 2011), review denied, 157 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 2014). 
542. Id. at 1069; see also Ruiz, 899 So. 2d at 1132. 
543. Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1067. 
544. Id. 
545. Id. at 1068. 
546. Id. at 1067. 
547. Id. at 1068. 
548. See Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1068; FLA. STAT. § 90.502(c) (2014). 
549. Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1065–66. 
550. Boozer v. Stalley, 146 So. 3d 139, 144 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (en 
banc); see also Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Scoma, 975 So. 2d 461, 465 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
551. See Maharaj v. Geico Cas. Co., 289 F.R.D. 666, 670 (S.D. Fla. 2013). 
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obtained in third-party bad faith actions.552  Thus, it found the protective 
order should have been granted in Boozer.553 
The court in so doing, recognized the uncertainty in this area and 
certified the following question as one of great public importance: 
“DO THE DECISIONS IN ALLSTATE INDEMNITY CO. V. RUIZ . . 
. AND GENOVESE V. PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE CO. 
. . . SHIELD ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS 
FROM DISCOVERY IN THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH LITIGATION?”554 
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction on this 
question.555  However, before any briefs were filed, both parties moved to 
dismiss, and the court granted the motion.556  Justices Pariente and Lewis 
both filed dissents from the dismissal.557  Both justices argued that once the 
court accepted jurisdiction, it could still decide the issue regardless of the 
parties’ motions.558  Justice Pariente noted that the underlying bad faith claim 
had been removed to federal court.559  Thus, the privilege issue might arise 
again there, and the Supreme Court of Florida could be asked to decide it on 
a certified question.560  Both justices also recognized the present uncertainty 
that exists in this area and the need for its resolution.561 
This is an issue that is not likely to go away.  When and how the 
Supreme Court of Florida ultimately resolves it cannot be determined.  The 
author believes that proponents of the privilege protection have the better 
argument.  If Florida is to recognize the privilege, then it should recognize it 
for all cases unless exceptional reasons exist for doing otherwise.  Since the 
privilege is a creature of statute, any exceptions should be recognized first by 
the legislature.  Yes, application of the privilege may mean that in some 
individual cases it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs like 
Stalley to successfully bring a claim.  But that is the price to be paid 
whenever privilege protection exists.  The legislature has decided so far that 
this price is one generally worth paying.562  The decision whether to change 
this should be left in its hands. 
                                                 
552. Boozer, 146 So. 3d at 144. 
553. See id. at 141, 148. 
554. Id. at 148 (citations omitted). 
555. Stalley v. Boozer, 40 Fla. L. Weekly S221b (Fla. Apr. 17, 2015). 
556. Id. 
557. Id. 
558. Id. 
559. Id. (Pariente, J., dissenting). 
560. Stalley, 40 Fla. L. Weekly S221b (Pariente J., dissenting). 
561. Id. (Pariente and Lewis, JJ., dissenting). 
562. FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (2014). 
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B. Crime-Fraud Exception 
Statutorily, there are five exceptions where otherwise confidential 
communications are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.563  The 
most commonly invoked and discussed exception is the one dealing with 
claims of crime or fraud.564  The whole purpose for the privilege’s existence 
in the first place is to encourage people to seek legal advice without creating 
situations where either what prospective clients tell attorneys or what 
attorneys tell clients will come back to haunt the client.565  Lawyers need 
accurate and complete information from clients in order to best advise them, 
and clients should not be afraid their attorneys’ advice will be disclosed to 
the world unless the client chooses to do so.566  However, when a client seeks 
assistance for legally unworthy purposes, such as for advice on how to 
commit a crime or on how to hide assets from creditors after the fact, the 
privilege’s purposes are not being furthered.567 
During this Survey period, one case provided important instruction 
on how trial courts should proceed when claims of the crime-fraud exception 
are made.568  In Merco Group of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. McGregor,569 
judgment creditors served subpoenas upon Merco Group’s lawyers, seeking 
documents on the location and treatment of funds that had been put into 
Merco’s lawyers’ trust account.570  Merco opposed the subpoena, claiming 
the records were attorney-client privilege protected among other reasons.571  
The trial court rejected all other reasons572 except the privilege claim.573  As 
to that, the judge ordered production of all documents for in camera review 
and also instructed Merco to file a privilege log identifying each specific 
document it claimed privileged.574  After this and an additional hearing on 
issues of relevancy, the judge ordered production of the documents, finding 
prima facie evidence Merco had used the attorney-client relationship to 
                                                 
563. Id. § 90.502(4)(a)–(e). 
564. Id. § 90.502(4)(a).  No case during this Survey period discussed any of the 
four other exceptions. 
565. See Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1065–66. 
566. See id. 
567. See Merco Grp. of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. McGregor, 162 So. 3d 49 
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  
568. See id. at 51. 
569. 162 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
570. Id. at 50. 
571. Id. 
572. Id.  The opinion does not state what these reasons were.  Id. 
573. McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 50. 
574. Id. 
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conceal assets that should have been discoverable.575  From this order Merco 
petitioned for certiorari.576 
The Fourth District agreed that the trial court’s procedure was 
improper and that its production order should be at least temporarily 
quashed.577  There was no error in ordering the in camera inspection of the 
documents. 578   The court also did not address whether the trial judge’s 
conclusion that the creditors had made a prima facie of fraud was correct.  
Where the trial court erred was in not holding a subsequent evidentiary 
hearing after this finding where Merco could try to provide a “reasonable 
explanation of its conduct or communications.”579  Thus, whenever there is a 
claim the crime-fraud exception requires production of otherwise privileged 
information, at least two hearing should be required.580  The first hearing 
should be to address whether the exception might lie.581  This should be 
followed by in camera inspection that would protect the privileged 
information if the privilege claim is sustained.582  If the trial finds a prima 
facie case that the exception applies, an evidentiary hearing must be afforded 
the party claiming the privilege to further explain why the court’s tentative 
conclusion is incorrect.583  Only after rejecting any explanations from the 
privilege’s proponent should disclosure be ordered.584 
The hearing at which a party claims the exception applies must be 
noticed as an evidentiary one if the party plans to introduce proof there.585  
Otherwise, counsel cannot fairly defend against claims the privilege is 
inapplicable. 586   Failure to properly notify an opponent that a scheduled 
hearing is meant to be evidentiary in nature should mean that both any 
finding of fraud made there and any in camera inspection order should be 
quashed on certiorari. 587   This situation occurred in Trans Health 
Management, Inc. v. Nunziata588 during this Survey period.589 
                                                 
575. Id. at 50–51.  The opinion also does not state what the judgment against 
Merco was for and how much it was for.  Id. at 50. 
576. Id. at 51. 
577. McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 51–52. 
578. Id. at 51. 
579. Id. 
580. Id. 
581. Id. 
582. McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 51. 
583. See id. at 50–51. 
584. See id. at 51. 
585. See id. 
586. Id. 
587. McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 51–52; see also Trans Health Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Nunziata, 159 So. 3d 850, 859–60 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
588. 159 So. 3d 850 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
589. See id. at 859–60. 
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VI. PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
Florida law contains a statutory privilege for confidential 
communications between a psychotherapist 590  and patient. 591   Section 
90.503(2) of the Florida Statutes provides in part that patients have a general 
privilege against disclosure of confidential communications to their 
psychotherapist with several statutory exceptions.592  The broad nature and 
scope of this privilege is obviously to encourage people to seek assistance for 
their mental or emotional problems without having their discussions about 
them revealed to the world.  During 2014, three reported cases discussed 
various aspects of this privilege.593 
A. The Privilege in General 
S.P. ex. rel. R.P. v. Vecchio594 demonstrates that the privilege affords 
protections to some persons who are not formal parties to litigation.  Vecchio 
was accused of multiple sexual offenses against a fourteen-year-old child.595  
The child told a night security guard at a condominium she had escaped from 
a man who molested her.596  The child received a physical exam from a Child 
Protection Team doctor which revealed semen in her vaginal area.597  Police 
interviewed Vecchio after the security guard identified him from surveillance 
footage in one of the condominium’s elevators. 598   Vecchio admitted 
                                                 
590. FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(a)(1)–(4) (2014).  The definition of 
psychotherapist under this privilege is extremely broad.  See id.  It includes medical doctors, 
psychologists, credentialed clinical social workers, mental health counselors, family 
therapists, and treatment personnel of certain statutorily listed facilities if these persons “are 
engaged primarily in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including 
alcoholism and other drug addiction.”  Id. 
The definition also includes advanced registered nurse practitioners who are 
engaged in similar diagnosis or treatment care.  Id. § 90.503(1)(a)(5). 
591. Id. § 90.503(1)(b).  A patient is someone who consults or is interviewed 
by a psychotherapist for “diagnosis or treatment of mental or emotional condition[s], 
including alcoholism and other drug addiction.”  FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(b). 
592. See id. § 90.503(2)–(4). 
593. See S.P. ex rel. R.P. v. Vecchio, 162 So. 3d 75, 77 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014); State v. Topps, 142 So. 3d 978, 979 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Scully v. Shands 
Teaching Hosp. Clinics, Inc., 128 So. 3d 986, 988 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
594. 162 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
595. Id. at 77. 
596. Id. 
597. Id. 
598. Id. 
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performing sexual acts with the victim.599  The semen discovered in the exam 
also was found to be the defendant’s.600 
The victim had been sent out of state for treatment.601  Unfortunately. 
she relapsed after ten months of treatment when she heard the case against 
Vecchio had not been concluded.602  The treatment center filed a declaration 
of her unavailability, and the state said it would proceed without her as a 
witness.603  Vecchio moved to subpoena her medical, psychiatric, and other 
records.604  The trial court conducted an in camera review of the records and 
made one of them available to the defense.605  The others were re-sealed.606  
After this, the defendant pled open “to lewd or lascivious battery, lewd or 
lascivious molestation, and battery on a child.”607  The State’s sentencing 
memorandum mentioned the victim’s continuing emotional distress, and her 
father testified about the same.608  Vecchio moved the trial court to unseal the 
victim’s records, so he could raise a discovery violation on appeal.609  S.P., 
the victim’s natural guardian opposed unsealing the records, arguing they 
were private and privileged.610  The trial court granted Vecchio’s motion, and 
the State petitioned for certiorari review, which was granted.611 
The Fourth District quashed the trial court’s order for several 
reasons.612  Under Florida law, the Florida Constitution’s Right to Privacy613 
protected the victim’s medical records from disclosure.614  Florida statutory 
law also protects confidential medical records from disclosure.615  Finally, 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege protected her confidential 
communications to her doctors and others, made so she could get 
treatment. 616   The privilege admittedly created three statutory exceptions 
where disclosure was allowed:  “(1) during involuntary commitment 
proceedings, (2) when . . . a court order[s] mental examination[s], [and] (3) 
                                                 
599. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 77. 
600. Id. 
601. Id. 
602. See id. 
603. Id. at 77–78. 
604. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 78. 
605. Id. 
606. Id. 
607. Id. 
608. Id. 
609. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 78. 
610. Id. at 79. 
611. Id. 
612. Id. at 81. 
613. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
614. Id.; S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79. 
615. FLA. STAT. § 456.057(7)(a) (2014); S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79. 
616. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79. 
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when the patient . . . relies on [his] mental condition . . . as [a] claim or 
defense” in litigation.617  However, none of these applied.618  The Fourth 
District also recognized that the privilege could be breached if good cause619 
was shown but declined to find such here.620  The records would only have 
confirmed the victim’s trauma already shown at the sentencing hearing.621  
As to any potential Brady v. Maryland622 discovery violation, the defendant 
did not meet his burden of showing this existed.623  The Fourth District also 
commended the trial court’s in camera review of the victim’s records as 
ensuring no exculpatory evidence was withheld.624 
The Fourth District’s last point, commending the trial court’s in 
camera review of alleged privileged records to see if an exception or good 
cause existed for their disclosure, stands in partial contrast to what happened 
in Scully v. Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc.625  There, the appellant 
had filed a perceived disability based claim under the Florida Civil Rights 
Act alleging she had been wrongly constructively discharged.626  The alleged 
constructive discharge came from Scully’s refusal to give Shands a copy of a 
monitoring contract with the Professional Resource Network (“PRN”).627  
Scully had been “admitted to a psychiatric hospital [due to] an adverse 
reaction to . . . medication for her psychiatric condition.”628  PRN assured 
Shands she could safely return to work and was in the process of establishing 
a monitoring contract with PRN.629 
Scully sought to protect her PRN records from discovery.630  The 
trial court denied her a protective order and ordered their production.631  
Scully sought certiorari review in the district court.632 
The First District found the records relevant and not protected by the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege as “Scully placed her medical and 
psychiatric condition[s]” in issue by both the basis of her “claim and her 
                                                 
617. Id. at 79–80; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.503(4)(a)–(c). 
618. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 80. 
619. Id. at 79; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.4615(2)(c). 
620. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79–80. 
621. Id. at 80. 
622. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
623. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79–80. 
624. Id. at 80. 
625. Id.; 128 So. 3d 986, 988 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
626. Scully, 128 So. 3d at 988. 
627. Id. at 987. 
628. Id. 
629. Id. 
630. Id. at 988. 
631. Scully, 128 So. 3d at 988. 
632. Id. 
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request for emotional . . . damages.”633  Thus, a statutory exception contained 
in the privilege existed634 and some disclosure was appropriate.635 
However, the disclosure’s scope was inappropriate. 636   PRN had 
made its determination Scully could safely return to work in November 
2011. 637   The discovery request asked for any medical records and 
information about her without setting any time limitations.638  The trial court 
compounded this problem, but not limiting its order to the time period related 
to Scully’s claims.639  Furthermore, unlike the trial court in S.P., the trial 
court here had conducted no in camera review to make sure only records 
relevant to Scully’s claim were ordered disclosed.640  Thus, the case was 
remanded for the trial court to do so.641 
The message collectively sent about the psychotherapist-privilege by 
these two decisions should be clear.  Florida law seeks to protect as 
privileged, psychotherapist-patient confidential communications unless there 
is a clear good reason for not doing so.642  Even then, the privilege must be 
protected to all extent possible consistent with the legitimate needs of the 
parties.643  Thus, even when a statutory exception or other good cause for 
disclosure exists, trial courts should do in camera records review to make 
sure their disclosure orders are not broader than they should be. 
2. Confidential Communications and Third Party Presence 
Like any other privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege can be 
waived by its holder.644  Section 90.503(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes defines 
a confidential communications as one “not intended to be disclosed to third 
persons”645 except for three instances.646  Usually the presence of a third 
party to an otherwise confidential communication will destroy the 
                                                 
633. Id. 
634. See FLA. STAT. § 90.503(4)(c) (2014) (providing that there is no privilege 
when any party “relies upon the [mental or emotional condition of the patient] as an element 
of [the party’s] claim or defense.”). 
635. Scully, 128 So. 3d at 988. 
636. Id. at 989. 
637. Id. at 987. 
638. Id. at 988. 
639. Id. at 988–89. 
640. S.P. ex rel. R.P. v. Vecchio, 162 So. 3d 75, 80 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014); Scully, 128 So. 3d at 989. 
641. Scully, 128 So. 3d at 989. 
642. See FLA. STAT. § 90.503 (2014). 
643. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79. 
644. State v. Topps, 142 So. 3d 978, 981 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
645. FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(c). 
646. Id. § 90.503(1)(c)(1)–(3). 
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communication’s confidentiality and waive the privilege. 647   The Fourth 
District in a case of first impression recently discussed a situation where it 
found that should not be so.648 
Avery Topps stabbed a dog to death and then tried to be admitted to 
a hospital.649  A deputy sheriff went to the hospital to arrest Topps.650  An 
emergency room doctor acting as a psychotherapist to possibly provide either 
for the defendant’s psychiatric commitment or for his clearance to be jailed 
examined Topps with the deputy in the room.651  The deputy was present to 
provide for the medical staff’s safety. 652   As standard part of Topps’ 
psychiatric evaluation, the doctor asked Topps why he came to the 
hospital.653  Topps then told the doctor about the stabbing.654  The State 
argued Topps waived any privilege by making the statements in the 
officer’sa third partypresence.655 
The trial court agreed with Topps and granted his motion to exclude 
the statement as privileged.656  In so doing, the judge found the officer had 
been present for multiple reasons:  to keep custody of Topps, to ensure 
medical staff safety, and to make sure Topps got needed medical attention.657  
Thus, as Topps had sought the treatment himself, “the deputy’s presence 
furthered the interest of the patient by allowing the examination to take place 
even though he was in custody as an arrestee.”658 
The Fourth District acknowledged the general rule that when a third 
party hears a communication, that can often destroy confidentiality and make 
testimony about it admissible.659  However, the privilege statutory language 
recognizes there are times when third parties may be needed to help 
communication in the therapeutic setting or otherwise aid the patient’s 
interest in getting diagnosis or treatment.660  One of those third party groups 
are “[t]hose persons present to further the interest of the patient in the 
consultation, examination, or interview.” 661   Another group includes 
                                                 
647. Topps, 142 So. 3d at 981. 
648. Id. at 978. 
649. Id. at 979. 
650. Id. 
651. Id. 
652. Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979. 
653. Id. 
654. Id. 
655. Id. 
656. Id. 
657. Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979. 
658. Id. 
659. Id. at 979–80. 
660. Id. at 980; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(c) (2014). 
661. FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(c)(1). 
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“persons necessary for the transmission of the communication.” 662   The 
deputy fell into both of these groups.663 
The deputy’s presence furthered Topps’s interest in getting care 
because without it, no attempt to treat him would have occurred.664  Topps 
would not have been left alone with the doctor without law enforcement 
there.665  So the deputy’s presence was essential to Topps getting any help at 
all.666  The deputy was also a person whose presence was needed for the 
transmission of the communication because again, without the deputy being 
present, Topps would not have been allowed to be with the doctor.667  The 
doctor needed Topps’s statement as to why Topps came to the hospital for 
help.668  Topps would never have been able to make this statement if he had 
been immediately removed from the hospital itself. 669   Additionally, no 
follow-up on the statement could be done without it being made in the first 
place.670 
The Fourth District noted that sometimes a third party’s presence 
when a statement is made implies a waiver of an otherwise privileged 
communication.671  That should not be the case here because the deputy’s 
presence was not voluntary on Topps’s part.672  As long as Topps stayed in 
the room with the doctor, the deputy would be there whether Topps wished it 
or not.673  Since waivers usually must be voluntary or at least be implied 
voluntary from reasonable circumstances, no express or implied waiver was 
found here.674 
The Topps opinion also gives several cogent policy reasons why 
waiver should not be found here.  The policy behind the privilege is to not 
only protect certain communications patients do not want widely revealed 
but also to encourage those who feel in need of mental health care to seek it.  
Finding waiver here would discourage persons who commit criminal acts 
from seeking the mental health assistance they need.  Finally, as the court 
                                                 
662. Id. § 90.503(1)(c)(2).  A third group is “persons who are participating in 
the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist.”  Id. § 90.503(1)(c)(3).  
This third group clearly did not exist in State v. Topps.  See id. § 90.503(1)(c)(3); Topps, 142 
So. 3d at 978, 980–81. 
663. See Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979, 981–82. 
664. Id. at 981. 
665. Id. at 981–82. 
666. See id. 
667. Id. 
668. Topps, 142 So. 3d at 981. 
669. See id. at 981–82. 
670. See id. at 982. 
671. Id. at 981. 
672. Id. 
673. Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979, 981. 
674. Id. at 981–82. 
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noted, people should not have to give up their privilege against self-
incrimination to seek medical treatment and diagnosis.675 
Several points apparently not raised by the State are not addressed by 
the court’s opinion.  Topps could have arguably whispered his answer to the 
doctor or have insisted the deputy stand far enough away so the deputy could 
not hear the answer.676  In theory, either of these could have been done.  To 
insist that they be done to preserve the privilege would be ridiculous.  First, 
Topps was already having problems or believed he had serious problems.  
Why else would he have gone to the hospital?  To require under these 
circumstances that he whisper his answer would be to require extraordinary 
action from him.  People should not have to go to extreme lengths to 
preserve their privileges.  Second, even if Topps had wanted the deputy to 
stand far enough away so the deputy could not hear, the deputy might not 
have agreed to do so.  Indeed, if concern for medical staff safety was one 
reason for the deputy’s presence, having him stand far away from Topps and 
the doctor could actually increase the risk of harm to medical staff.  Topps 
supposedly had just engaged in a violent act, what is there to say he might 
not do so against the doctor? 
The court’s opinion is a wise accommodation between the need for 
safety, security, and the need to have certain communications protected, so 
they will be made to begin with.  True, the exclusion of Topps’s statement 
may mean there is not sufficient evidence to convict him.  But the loss of 
potential evidence is always the price that must be paid to recognize and 
enforce a privilege’s protection.  The legislature has decided this is not too 
great a price to pay to promote psychotherapist-patient interchange.677  Topps 
goes far in respecting and furthering that decision. 
VII. HEARSAY 
Unless someone is a hermit and lives alone in a cave or is a castaway 
stranded alone on a deserted island without any modern means of contact 
with the outside world, communication with other people is a daily fact of 
life.  Indeed, one can hardly go through an ordinary day without it.  As a 
result, many to most trials involve some testimony about what people say or 
write to one another.678  When these out-of-court statements are offered for 
their truth at trial, hearsay issues arise.679 
                                                 
675. Id. at 982; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
676. Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979–81. 
677. See FLA. STAT. § 90.503(c) (2014). 
678. See id. § 90.801(1); Topps, 142 So. 3d at 978–79; infra notes 800–10 and 
accompanying text. 
679. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c). 
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Section 90.801 of the Florida Statutes defines hearsay as “a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
[other] hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.”680  In theory, hearsay is inadmissible at trial.681  However, any 
experienced lawyer or judge knows this is a myth.  Despite the general 
prohibition against admitting hearsay statements, most hearsay statements 
fall within either one of three statutory exemptions682 or one of the thirty 
exceptions to the general prohibition in the rules.683 
The key to handling hearsay issues is to first determine if a statement 
is hearsay to begin, with and, if so, then consider whether it falls within an 
exemption or exception.  If a statement is not being offered for its truth, it is 
not hearsay.684  If hearsay falls within an exemption, it also is not considered 
hearsay, despite having all the attributes of a classical hearsay statement.685  
At one time, a number of common misconceptions as to what was or was not 
hearsay were prevalent.  One would think that after almost forty years under 
the Code these misconceptions would no longer exist.  Unfortunately, one 
recent case meriting brief mention shows that this is not so.686  In Taylor v. 
State,687 a victim told a police officer about the defendant’s alleged threats 
against her shortly after they happened.688   The defense objected to her 
testifying about these statements and convinced the trial court her statements 
                                                 
680. Id. § 90.801(1)(c). 
681. Id. § 90.802.  This principle is embodied by section 90.802 of the Florida 
Statutes, which states that “[e]xcept as provided by statute, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.”  
Id. 
682. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(a)–(c).  Section 90.801 of the Florida Statutes, 
after defining hearsay, provides three explicit situations where statements, which would 
otherwise fall within this definition, are declared exempt from the prohibition:  (1) prior 
inconsistent statements under oath; (2) prior consistent statements offered to rebut claims the 
declarant has a motive to falsify or fabricate; and (3) prior statements of identification.  Id. § 
90.801(1)(c), (2)(a)–(c).  All three exemptions require that the declarant’s whose statement is 
being introduced testify and be subject to cross-examination about the earlier statement.  Id. § 
90.801(2)(a)–(c). 
683. Section 90.803 of the Florida Statutes, which does not require declarant 
unavailability, contains twenty-four exceptions.  See id. § 90.803.  Section 90.804 of the 
Florida Statutes, which does have a declarant unavailability condition, has an additional six 
exceptions.  See id. § 90.804. 
684. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1); Caballero v. State, 132 So. 3d 369, 371 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that a victim’s prior inconsistent statement that the defendant 
had not sexually battered her at a certain time was not hearsay, as it would have been 
admissible for impeachment purposes and not for its truth). 
685. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801. 
686. See Taylor v. State, 146 So. 3d 113, 114–15 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
687. 146 So. 3d 113 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
688. Id. at 114. 
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did not fall within the excited utterance exception.689  However, the trial 
court ruled her statements were not hearsay at all690 because the victim, the 
declarant, was available and subject to cross-examination at trial.691  As the 
Fifth District declared, “[i]n so ruling, the trial [court] articulated a common 
misconception about the hearsay rule.”692  Only if the victim’s out-of-court 
statements, which were clearly offered as a truthful account of what just 
happened to her, fell within one of the three exemptions in the rule could 
they be considered non-hearsay.693  As they did not, the statements were 
hearsay despite the declarant’s availability for cross-examination at trial.694 
As with other areas of evidence law, not every case mentioning the 
hearsay rule merits.  Thus, this Survey does not discuss cases arising during 
2014 concerning the following issues of hearsay:  hearsay in restitution 
hearings, 695  hearsay in probation revocation hearings, 696  corpus delicti 
rule,697 prior consistent statements,698 state of mind exception,699 and past 
                                                 
689. Id. at 115; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2).  As the Fifth District said on 
appeal, this ruling was wrong.  See Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115–16. 
690. Id. at 115. 
691. Id. 
692. Id. 
693. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2); Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115. 
694. Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115. 
695. See Phillips v. State, 141 So. 3d 702, 705, 707 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (finding a trial court erred in allowing a victim to testify as to the value of stole items 
when the testimony was based on a website the victim had consulted). 
696. See McDoughall v. State, 133 So. 3d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (finding hearsay admissible at probation revocation hearings, but it cannot provide the 
only basis for revocation). 
697. Burks v. State, 613 So. 2d 441, 446 (Fla. 1993) (Shaw, J., concurring and 
dissenting).  Before the State can introduce an accused’s statement’s to prove an offense, it 
must offer evidence to independently prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged.  Id. at 443.  
The corpus delicti has been defined as “the fact that a crime has actually been committed, that 
someone is criminally responsible” for it.  Id.  (internal quotation omitted); see also J.B. v. 
State, 166 So. 3d 813, 815–17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (reversing defendant’s petit theft 
conviction where the only evidence other than her admissions to the theft was inadmissible 
hearsay testimony from store employees who did not see the crime itself but only testified to 
an absent declarant’s statements). 
The general corpus delicti rule is not statutorily codified, but comes from cases 
construing the Code’s exception for personal admissions.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(18)(a).  In 
certain types of sexual abuse crimes, the corpus delicti rule has statutorily been relaxed.  See 
id. § 92.565(2) (provides that in certain prosecutions for sexual crimes, an accused’s 
statements can be introduced without proof of the corpus delicti if the trial court finds that 
“the state is unable to show the existence of each element of the crime, and . . . finds that the 
defendant’s confession or admission is trustworthy”).  However, this does not preclude the 
state from introducing a defendant’s confession by satisfying the traditional requirements of 
corpus delicti needed for other, non-sexual offenses.  See Ramirez v. State, 133 So. 3d 648, 
652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that when the state meets the traditional corpus 
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recollection recorded exception. 700   Several significant cases on hearsay 
topics are discussed below.701 
A. Excited Utterances 
1. In General 
One of the traditionally recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is 
that of excited utterances. 702   Section 90.803(2) of the Florida Statutes 
defines these as “[a] statement or excited utterance relating to a startling 
event or condition made while the declaring was under the stress of 
                                                                                                                   
delicti requirement, the hearing and findings required under section 92.565 of the Florida 
Statutes do not apply). 
698. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(b); Howard v. State, 152 So. 3d 825, 828–29 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that statement did not qualify under the exemption for 
prior consistent statements, under section 90.801(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes, as a state 
witness’s prior consistent statements elicited on direct examination were used prematurely to 
improperly bolster the witness’s testimony before any cross-examination had been done 
suggesting the witness was being untruthful). 
699. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(3)(a); Combs v. State, 133 So. 3d 564, 567 (Fla. 
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that statements of a third party that he and another man 
planned to rob a bank defendant was accused of robbing should have been admitted under the 
state of mind exception).  The statements showed the declarant’s present intent to do a future 
act, and the actual robbery provided enough of a basis to show the declarant had acted 
consistent with this intent.  FLA. STAT. § 90.803(3)(a); see also Combs, 133 So. 3d at 567. 
Under this exception, the statements must be offered to prove the declarant’s, not 
someone else’s state of mind or subsequent acts, and the declarant’s state of mind must be 
relevant.  FLA. STAT. § 90.803(3)(a); see also Combs, 133 So. 3d at 567.  For a recent case 
finding error in admitting statements under this exception when the declarant’s state of mind 
was not relevant, see Henderson v. State,135 So. 3d 472, 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
700. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(5); Blount v. State, 152 So. 3d 29, 30–31 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding the deposition of a victim who claimed he could not 
completely remember the event testified to in the deposition qualified as past recollection 
recorded when the other requirements for the exception were met); McNeal v. State, 143 So. 
3d 1078, 1079–80 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that before a writing qualifies under 
this exception, the declarant must verify its accuracy or correctness.  Here the victim’s failure 
to do so for her written out-of-court statement disqualified it under this exception.). 
This Survey’s author notes that the defense did not object to the deposition being 
entered at trial on grounds that it would have violated the accused’s Confrontation Clause 
rights.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Blount, 152 So. 3d at 30.  Hopefully such an objection 
would be made if the state tries to make similar use of deposition in the future.  See Blount, 
152 So. 3d at 30.  Whether the accused would have had a prior opportunity to cross-examine 
the victim for confrontation purposes would then have to be addressed.  See Yero v. State, 138 
So. 3d 1179, 1184 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  To the author’s knowledge, no reported case 
in Florida has addressed this issue. 
701. See infra Sections VII.A–C. 
702. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2). 
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excitement caused by the event or condition.”703  This exception and its 
requirements have been discussed in many reported cases.704  Depending 
upon which case one wishes to cite, the exception has either two or three 
elements.705  State v. Jano706 appears to have the most complete one.  There 
the Court found three requirements for the exception:  (1) there must be an 
event sufficient to cause nervous excitement, (2) the declarant must in fact 
have been excited by the event, and (3) the declarant’s statement was made 
while the excitement from the event was continuing.707  Another way of 
saying this by use of a trilogy is that there must be an excited statement made 
by an excited person whose excitement was caused by an exciting event.  As 
this exception comes up fairly frequently, especially in criminal cases, the 
cases mentioning it during this Survey period are worth reviewing. 
Nine-one-one telephone calls present a common scenario where a 
party, usually the State, argues there are excited utterances.708  Emergency 
phone calls seem to so intuitively involve excited utterances that courts and 
attorneys may make the mistake of assuming this is so.709  With any other 
exception, the proponent of the hearsay has the burden of demonstrating its 
requirements are met.710  When an objection is made, the trial court should 
hold a brief hearing or make explicit findings on the record concerning the 
exception’s requirements before admitting the statements.711  Failure to do so 
can often result in reversal.712 
Unless the declarant or someone who knew and heard the declarant 
when the call is made testifies, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy 
the exception’s requirements.  For example, in Brandon v. State713, a 911 
caller identified the defendant as the person who had assaulted the caller and 
threatened her husband.714  When the caller could not be at trial to testify 
                                                 
703. Id. 
704. See State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1988); Taylor v. State, 146 
So. 3d 113, 115 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Brandon v. State, 138 So. 3d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
705. See Jano, 524 So. 2d at 661; Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115; Brandon, 138 So. 
3d at 1152. 
706. 524 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1988). 
707. Id. at 661; see also Stoll v. State, 762 So. 2d 870, 873–74 (Fla. 2000) 
(later discussed these same requirements but merely combined the second and third ones, so as 
to find two, instead of three requirements.  Substantively this makes no difference). 
708. See Morrison v. State, 161 So. 3d 564, 565 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); 
Tucker v. State, 884 So. 2d 168, 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
709. See Morrison, 161 So. 3d at 565. 
710. See Brandon, 138 So. 3d at 1152. 
711. See id. at 1151–52; FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2) (2014). 
712. See, e.g., Brandon, 138 So. 3d at 1152. 
713. 138 So. 3d 1150 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
714. Id. at 1151. 
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about the events, the State offered the call’s contents to prove them.715  After 
the contents were admitted and the accused convicted, the appellate court 
reversed.716  As neither the caller nor someone who knew her testified, the 
State never proved the caller’s identify.717  Likewise, since the State only 
could produce testimony from the person who received the call, there was no 
proof whether the caller was excited at the time, and even more importantly, 
how long after the alleged assault and threats the call had been made.718  
Without showing the time element, the State could not establish that the 
declarant had no time to contrive or to reflect on the alleged event.719  In 
fairness to the State, it appears the prosecution may have been surprised by 
the alleged victim’s absence. 720   However Brandon shows that in some 
instances it is better to just drop charges than try to stretch meager facts to fit 
an exception.  At least the wasted cost of trial and appeal is not incurred then. 
Taylor, referred to above, shows the requirement that the declarant 
be excited cannot be taken to an extreme. 721   The defendant allegedly 
threatened and shot at the victim who drove away in her car.722  She went to 
a restaurant to call 911 but stopped from doing so when she saw a police 
officer.723  Instead, the victim promptly told the officer what happened.724  
The trial court allowed the officer to testify about what the victim had said 
on the erroneous ground it was not hearsay, after making the equally 
erroneous finding the statements were not excited utterances. 725   After 
Taylor’s conviction, the Fifth District found the statements should have been 
admissible as excited utterances, even though they clearly were hearsay.726  
The officer testified the victim had calmed down some so she could tell him 
what happened; however, she was still shaking, crying, and appeared 
excited.727  Thus “[a]though she may have calmed down enough to speak”728 
as the officer had said she did, the overall excitement from the shooting and 
                                                 
715. Id. 
716. Id. at 1152. 
717. Id. 
718. Brandon, 138 So. 3d at 1152. 
719. Id. 
720. See id. at 1151. 
721. See Taylor v. State, 146 So. 3d 113, 115–16 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
722. Id. at 114. 
723. Id. 
724. Id. 
725. Id. at 114–16. 
726. Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115–16. 
727. Id. at 116. 
728. Id. 
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threats just minutes previously existed. 729   Therefore, the statements fell 
within the exception.730 
2. The First Complaint Exception 
Under the Code, hearsay statements are only admissible as provided 
by statute.731  Thus, theoretically only exceptions explicitly listed in the Code 
should be recognized.  However, some Florida courts continue to recognize a 
common law exception not explicitly listed, sometimes similar to the one for 
excited utterances.  Twenty years ago, Pacifico v. State732 found that if the 
alleged victim of a sexual assault or battery makes a statement “at [the] first 
opportunity to complain to anyone other than [the alleged attacker] after the 
sexual encounter,” the statement would be admissible over a hearsay 
objection.733  Subsequent case law found that even if the victim’s first try to 
complain to another person is unsuccessful, later statements to that same 
person about the assault may fall under the first complaint exception if they 
are not made after “an unduly long period of time.”734 
Pacifico suggests the statements would be admissible even if they do 
not qualify under any other hearsay exception.735  Another court, soon after 
the Pacifico decision, took a slightly more restrictive approach to the first 
complaint exception.736  In Burgess v. State,737 the court took an approach 
that might be described as an attempt to split the baby, even though it is hard 
to view this decision as having much Solomonic quality.  Burgess recognized 
the exception’s existence but limited its contents to “only the fact of the 
report of the sexual battery but not the details.”738  Burgess would require 
that statements reporting the details satisfy the statutory elements of another 
hearsay exceptionone mentioned in the Codesuggesting this would 
probably be either one for excited utterances or for present sense 
impressions. 739   This presents the unusual situation that under the first 
complaint exception, a jury might be able to hear the victim say she had 
reported being attacked but would not be able to hear any details from the 
                                                 
729. Id. 
730. Id. 
731. FLA. STAT. § 90.802 (2014). 
732. 642 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
733. Id. at 1186. 
734. Fletcher v. State, 698 So. 2d 579, 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App 1997); see 
also Burgess v. State, 644 So. 2d 589, 591 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
735. Pacifico, 642 So. 2d at 1186–87. 
736. Burgess, 644 So. 2d at 591–92. 
737. 644 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
738. Id. at 591. 
739. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(1)–(2) (2014); Burgess, 644 So. 2d at 591–92. 
66
Nova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol40/iss1/5
2015] EVIDENCE:  2014 SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW 139 
victim about the attack unless, of course, the statement describing the details 
falls within a statutory exception.  So then why is first complaint exception 
needed in the first place? 
Apparently, the answer is that a relatively prompt first complaint 
rebuts any claim the victim had consented to the sexual acts involved.  Case 
law before passage of the Code admits such complaints to corroborate the 
victim’s testimony.740  If the victim complained about being attacked when 
she first had a chance, then her actual testimony about the attack in court is 
more likely to be true.741  Under this theory a statement giving details of the 
attack is not necessary for corroboration.  The complaint is not being offered 
for its details but for the fact that it was made relatively promptly thereafter.  
Under this theory, the statement is not being offered for its truth but for the 
mere fact it was made; but then, it would not be hearsay in the first place.  So 
why is an exception needed?  Probably because courts realize that the mental 
gymnastics this line of reasoning requires juries to perform is difficult or 
impossible for them to do.  Juries will almost undoubtedly take a complaint 
to someone that I have been attacked as proof the attack happened and not as 
proof that the victim is not lying when she says at trial it happened. 
Thus, the exception itself rests on the theory that juries will perform 
mental exercises it is almost impossible for a reasonable person to do, 
regardless of whether a limiting instruction is given them or not.  However, if 
the statement is admissible under an exception, then—in theory—no limiting 
instruction is required.742  So then, why not also allow testimony under the 
exception about the details? 
Besides this problem with the exception, there is another difficulty 
with it.  The exception apparently rests on the now fallaciously proven idea 
that any female sexually attacked would of course report it at the very first 
chance.  What if the female does not do so?  Then, the sexual act must either 
never have taken place743 or have been consensual to begin with.  However, 
modern studies show that it is not unusual for victims to delay reporting 
                                                 
740. Ellis v. State, 6 So. 768, 770 (Fla. 1889) (noting that this is supposedly the 
first case to recognize this exception).  The Court there declared that: 
The female outraged should seek the first opportunity to complain, and the fact that 
she does complain goes to the jury as evidence; but her detailed statement of the 
circumstances under which she was outraged cannot be given in evidence . . . by the 
party to whom she made the statement. Such testimony is hearsay, and it is 
calculated to confuse and mislead the jury, and is not permissible. 
Id. 
741. See Custer v. State, 34 So. 2d 100, 106 (Fla. 1948) (en banc). 
742. See Pacifico v. State, 642 So. 2d 1178, 1186–87 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1994); McDonald v. State, 578 So. 2d 371, 373–74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
743. Custer, 34 So. 2d at 106.  Modern medical testimony now can much more 
effectively rebut this assertion.  See Pacifico, 642 So. 2d at 1181. 
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being attacked for various reasons, not including consent.744  Thus, the need 
for the first complaint exception is based on outdated, fallacious reasoning, 
both about sexual attack victims and the mental ability of juries. 
More recent case law has questioned the legitimacy of recognizing 
such an exception and suggested it is beyond the power of courts to judicially 
do so.745  The latest case questioning the exception’s very existence was 
decided during this Survey period.746  In Browne v. State,747 a college student 
intern at a doctor’s office claimed that the doctor had attempted to sexually 
batter her late one evening after her intern hours.748  The victim claimed she 
fought the defendant off, drove home, and called a friend about being upset 
because Browne was following her.749  The victim went to the friend’s home 
where she met the friend’s boyfriend.750  The defendant claimed the victim 
had consented to the encounter, and the State called the victim’s friend to 
testify about what the victim had told her that night. 751   Over defense 
objection, the friend was allowed to repeat the victim’s account based on 
either the first complaint or excited utterance exceptions.752 
The Fourth District found error in admission of the friend’s 
testimony and reversed the convictions. 753   As to the excited utterance 
exception, the State failed to establish how much time had passed between 
the alleged attack and when the statements were made; thus it did not satisfy 
the requirement that the victim had not had time for reflection.754  As to the 
first complaint exception argument, the court’s opinion was even more 
detailed.755 
The court noted that while some courts still accepted the existence of 
the first complaint exception, others did not.756  Section 90.802 of the Florida 
Statutes explicitly provided that the only exceptions to the hearsay rule were, 
                                                 
744. JON KRAKAUER, MISSOULA:  RAPE AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN A COLLEGE 
TOWN, at xiii (2015). 
745. See Browne v. State, 132 So. 3d 312, 316 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  
This case did not directly question the legitimacy of the first complaint exception.  Id.  
Instead, it questioned in general the legitimacy of any exception not recognized in the Code.  
Id. 
746. See id. 
747. 132 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
748. Id. at 314. 
749. See id. at 314–15. 
750. Id. at 315. 
751. Id. 
752. Browne, 132 So. 3d at 315–16; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2) (2014). 
753. Browne, 132 So. 3d at 317, 319. 
754. Id. at 317; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2). 
755. Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316–17. 
756. Id. at 316. 
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thus, statutorily recognized in the Code.757  Section 90.102 of the Florida 
Statutes provides that “[t]his chapter—[chapter 90]—shall replace and 
supersede existing . . . common law in conflict with its provisions.”758  Thus, 
section 90.802 of the Florida Statutes had effectively abolished the common 
law first complaint exception, and the legislature had not codified it. 759  
Therefore, the court found the exception no longer existed in Florida.760 
Browne’s reasoning seems hard to refute.  Although the court did not 
use this, it clearly was invoking the principle of statutory construction that a 
specific provision should control over a more general one.  Section 90.802 of 
the Florida Statutes specifically abolished all but statutory exceptions; thus, 
the first complaint exception no longer existed despite section 90.102 of the 
Florida Statutes’ general language. 761   Browne also provides interesting 
authority that the exception is no longer valid in Florida since the Fourth 
District had recognized the exception earlier in Burgess. 762   Although 
Browne did not expressly overrule Burgess, it certainly does so by 
implication. 
The Supreme Court of Florida has not yet decided this issue.763  
Until it does so, some courts may recognize the exception.  Better courts and 
good prosecutors will seek to avoid invoking it and instead try to use a 
statutory one in its place. 
B. Market Reports and Commercial Publications 
As mentioned above, the Code has three statutory exemptions and 
thirty statutory exceptions to the ban against using hearsay. 764   Most 
attorneys know the common ones.  Once in a great while, a decision will 
discuss what might be called one of the exotic exceptions to hearsay, in the 
sense that this exception is rarely, if ever, encountered in practice. 
                                                 
757. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.802, .803. 
758. Id. § 90.102. 
759. See id. §§ 90.102, .802; Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316. 
760. Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316–17; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 90.102, .802.  The 
court also found that even if the exception still had existed, the friend’s testimony went 
beyond just testifying about the complaint and recited the details of the alleged attack—
something the exception did not allow.  Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316–17. 
Finally, Browne rejected the argument that the victim’s statement was admissible as 
a prior consistent statement under section 90.801(2)(b) because the court found the victim had 
a motive to falsify before the statements were made.  Browne, 132 So. 3d at 317–18; see also 
FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(b). 
761. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.102, .802; see also Browne, 132 So. 3d at 315–16. 
762. See Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316; Burgess v. State, 644 So. 2d 589, 591–92 
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
763. See Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316–17. 
764. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.801, .803–.804. 
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Section 90.803(17) of the Florida Statutes contains one of the less 
frequently invoked exceptions to hearsay. 765   This section provides that 
“[m]arket quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published 
compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons in 
particular occupations if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of 
information and method of preparation were such as to justify their 
admission”766 are not excluded by the hearsay rule.767  This is commonly 
called the trade reports exception.768 
Until 2014, only one reported Florida case discussed this 
exception.769  In Health Options, Inc. v. Palmetto Pathology Services, P.A.,770 
the court upheld a party’s use of American Medical Association (“AMA”) 
terms and categories used for computer billings to establish damages for 
uncompensated services.771  The opposing party had used the same terms and 
codes, and these came from a trustworthy source, the AMA’s Current 
Procedural Terminology Editorial Panel.772 
During this Survey period, Hardy v. State,773 held that information in 
the Florida Department of Health’s computer database about prescription 
drugs did not come within the trade reports exception for two reasons.774  
First, section 90.803(17) of the Florida Statutes, unlike its federal 
counterpart, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(17),775 requires the information to 
be published. 776   The First District interpreted this to mean it must be 
available to the public.777  As access to the database was limited to certain 
authorized state employees, it did not qualify.778  Second, the court looked at 
the exception’s general title and found the database was not like a market 
                                                 
765. See id. 
766. Id. § 90.803(17). 
767. Id. 
768. See id.; Hardy v. State, 140 So. 3d 1016, 1019 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2014). 
769. See Health Options, Inc. v. Palmetto Pathology Servs., P.A., 983 So. 2d 
608, 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
770. 983 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
771. Id. at 616. 
772. Id. 
773. 140 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
774. Id. at 1019–20. 
775. FED. R. EVID. 803(17); FLA. STAT. § 90.803(17) (2014).  Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(17) states that “[m]arket quotations, lists, directories, or other compilations [that 
are] generally . . . relied [on] by the public or by persons in particular occupations” are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule.  FED. R. EVID. 803. 
776. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(17); Hardy, 140 So. 3d at 1020; see also FED. R. 
EVID. 803(17). 
777. Hardy, 140 So. 3d at 1020. 
778. Id. 
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report or other compilation commonly used in commerce.779  Thus, even if 
the data had been freely available to the public, it would still not fall within 
the exception.780 
Judge Rowe wrote a protracted dissent in which he interpreted the 
word published more broadly than the majority.781  According to him, “the 
court’s focus should be the purpose for which the information was 
disseminated rather than how widespread the information was 
disseminated.”782  The judge acknowledged the database was not published 
in the ordinary sense of the word but was still published to not only 
authorized Department of Health employees but also some law enforcement 
officers for limited purposes.783  He also argued that the database should be 
considered “within the category of other publications in the same ilk as a 
tabulation or list as set forth in the statute”784 even if it was not a compilation 
commonly used in commerce.785 
Judge Rowe’s dissent, while forcefully argued and well-written, 
ignores the exception’s express language.  The exception does not use the 
words other publications; it says other published compilations.786  So long as 
this database is not published within the ordinary sense of that word, under 
basic principles of statutory construction, the majority’s opinion has the 
better of this argument. 
C. Business Records in Foreclosure Cases 
Business records are among the commonly used hearsay exceptions, 
especially in commercial cases.787  During this Survey period, a number of 
reported decisions discussed the business records exception.788  All but one 
                                                 
779. Id. 
780. See id. 
781. Id. at 1022 (Rowe, J., dissenting). 
782. Hardy, 140 So. 3d at 1022 (Rowe, J., dissenting). 
783. Id. 
784. Id. 
785. See id. 
786. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(17) (2014). 
787. Id. § 90.803(6).  This section provides in part that: 
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, 
conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly 
conducted business activity and if it was the regular practice of that business 
activity to make such . . . . are not excluded by the general prohibition against 
hearsay. 
Id. 
788. See, e.g., Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952, 955–58 (Fla. 2008); Hunter v. 
Aurora Loan Servs. LLC, 137 So. 3d 570, 572–73 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), review 
denied, 157 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2014).  
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of them involved the introduction of bank records in loan foreclosure 
actions.789  The foreclosing party’s failure to either attempt to introduce any 
business records790 or failure to lay a proper foundation for their introduction 
resulted in a number of reversals.791 
The required elements for the business records exception are not in 
debate.  In Yisrael v. Florida,792 the Supreme Court of Florida clearly stated 
that proponents of business records must demonstrate four elements:  “(1) the 
record was made at or near the time of the event; (2) was made by or from 
information transmitted by a person with knowledge; (3) was kept in the 
                                                 
789. See Caldwell v. State, 137 So. 3d 590, 590−91 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014).  Caldwell was the one reported decision not involving loan foreclosure.  See id.  There 
the court reversed the defendant’s robbery conviction because of the admission of a booking 
report.  Id. at 590, 592.  The booking report and statements in it were used to prove the 
defendant’s height and weight at the time of his arrest.  Id. at 590–91.  Although the court 
found such reports could be business records under the hearsay exception, the State’s failure 
to lay a foundation for when the information in them was received, how the reports were kept, 
and that it was a regular practice to keep reports like this made this report inadmissible 
hearsay.  Id. at 591–92. 
790. See Beauchamp v. Bank of N.Y., 150 So. 3d 827, 828 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014).  Beauchamp reversed judgment for the bank because a loan service company 
representative’s testimony was admitted based on the records that had never been introduced 
into evidence and thus were inadmissible hearsay.  Id. at 827−29.  Although the opinion does 
not mention this, the testimony also violated the best evidence rule as it was about the material 
contents of a document that had not been admitted or otherwise accounted for.  See id. at 827–
28. 
791. See Kelsey v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 131 So. 3d 825, 826 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014).  Six reported decisions discussed the foundation for the business records.  See 
Burdeshaw v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 148 So. 3d 819, 822−26 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); 
Wolkoff v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 153 So. 3d 280, 282−83 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2014); Cayea v. Citimortgage, Inc., 138 So. 3d 1214, 1216–17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); 
Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 572; Lindsey v. Cadence Bank, N.A., 135 So. 3d 1164, 1167−68 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826.  Four of them found reversible error for 
failure to lay a proper foundation for admission under the business records exception.  See 
Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 820; Wolkoff, 153 So. 3d at 281–82; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 571; 
Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826.  Two affirmed judgments foreclosing on loans, finding no error in 
admission of bank records under the business records exception.  See Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 
1215; Lindsey, 135 So. 3d at 1169.  From this number of reversals, one might conclude that 
there are often problems introducing business records under the exception in loan foreclosure 
actions.  See, e.g., Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826.  This conclusion may not be correct as the 
number of the reported cases does not give any idea of how many cases there were actually 
tried or decided on summary judgment where there was no issue about a proper foundation.  
Contra id.  Perhaps the best that can be said from the reported decisions is that when the issue 
of business records foundations is raised on appeal in foreclosures, the courts are carefully 
scrutinizing the trial record to make sure the exception’s requirements have been satisfied.  
See Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 821−22; Wolkoff, 153 So. 3d at 281–82; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 
571−72; Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826. 
792. 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008). 
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ordinary course of a regularly conducted business activity; and (4) that it was 
regular practice of that business to make such a record.”793 
Thus, what must be shown should be no surprise to business records 
proponents.794  The problem seems to be how to do so.  Choosing the right 
person or persons to authenticate the records and lay their foundation under 
the exception is the critical choice.795  Two recent decisions provide good 
representative examples as to how and how not to go about laying the 
foundation needed for the business records exception.796 
To successfully foreclose on a loan, the foreclosing party must show 
an agreement between the borrower and the plaintiff or a subsequent legal 
transfer of the loan to the plaintiff, the borrower’s default on payments, an 
acceleration of the debt to maturity, and the amount remaining due on the 
loan.797  When the original lender transfers the loan to another party, laying 
the business records foundation to show all this has caused problems.798  
Usually to do so, the plaintiff attempts to introduce loan payment history 
records that are computer generated.799  Such computer printouts may qualify 
as business records assuming the proper foundation is laid even though the 
actual printout was done in connection with a particular lawsuit.800  The 
person called to authenticate the records and lay the foundation must, 
therefore, be familiar with the business practices of more than one company 
and with how each company takes, records, and keeps payments on loans.801  
While a witness’s testimony that certain computer programs and certain 
practices are standardly used in the lending industry is helpful, a witness’s 
testimony must also be specific with respect to how a particular company 
services its loans. 802   When a witness working for one company cannot 
testify about how another company who had been involved with the loan 
does this, then foundation problems occur unless additional witnesses are 
                                                 
793. Id. at 956. 
794. See, e.g., Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 1217; Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826. 
795. See Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 824; Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 1217; Hunter, 
137 So. 3d at 572–73; Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826; Wolkoff, 153 So. 3d at 282. 
796. Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 1217; Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826. 
797. Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826. 
798. Wolkoff, 153 So. 3d at 281. 
799. See, e.g., Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 1216. 
800. See id. at 1217 (stating that “[p]rintouts of data prepared for trial may be 
admitted . . . even if the printouts themselves are not kept in the ordinary course of business so 
long as a qualified witness testifies as to the manner of preparation, reliability, and 
trustworthiness”). 
801. See id. at 1217–18. 
802. See id.; Burdeshaw v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 148 So. 3d 819, 826 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Hunter v. Aurora Loan Servs. LLC, 137 So. 3d 570, 573 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 157 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2014). 
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called who can do so.803  This was the case in both Hunter v. Aurora Loan 
Services, LLC804 and Burdeshaw v. Bank of New York Mellon805 where the 
employee of the subsequent loan assignees could not testify how previous 
holders of loans kept and recorded their information.806  While a witness 
does not have to be the person who actually makes entries for payments on 
the loan—the person who actually keeps the loan records or the person who 
prepared the records for trial—the witness must know how the companies 
concerned do so.807 
These two decisions suggest that counsel for foreclosing lenders 
should be especially careful when more than one holder of a note or 
mortgage is involved.  Counsel should then always ask, “do I need more than 
one witness”, and “do I have the right witnesses to satisfy the business 
records foundation?”  Counsel must make their own investigation and 
evaluation to ensure this and not just assume that whomever the foreclosing 
party wants to send as a witness is sufficient. 
Contrary to these two cases, it is what happened in Cayea v. 
Citimortgage, Inc. 808   There, Citimortgage was the original loan holder, 
making matters easier than in multiple holder cases.809 
A company employee in its default research and litigation 
department testified about Citimortgage’s regular practice of inputting 
payments, whether made electronically or by mail, into its system by 
payment processing department employees. 810   He also testified how 
payment entries were kept and that it was the lender’s regular practice to do 
so.811  Although he did not work in the payment department himself and had 
not done any of the actual inputting or record keeping on this loan, his 
testimony was sufficient to admit computer printouts of the loan history as 
business records.812 
Foundations for business records should be no problem if an attorney 
takes the time to understand how a particular business or company is run and 
selects the proper witnesses to testify about this.  The Burdeshaw decision 
provides a helpful multi-page summary of the cases dealing with this 
                                                 
803. See Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 823; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 573. 
804. 137 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 157 So. 3d 
1040 (Fla. 2014). 
805. 148 So. 3d 819 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
806. Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 826; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 573. 
807. Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 823; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 573. 
808. 138 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
809. See id. at 1215. 
810. Id. at 1215–16. 
811. Id. 
812. Id. at 1217. 
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exception in loan foreclosure cases.813  This should be a required reading for 
counsel in this field. 
VIII. BEST EVIDENCE RULE 
Section 90.952 of the Florida Statutes provides in part that “an 
original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to prove the 
contents of the writing, recording, or photograph.”814  This requirement is 
commonly known as the Best Evidence Rule.815  The rule does not usually 
apply unless the contents of the writing, recording, or photograph are 
considered material to the issues in a case.816  Additionally, modern versions 
of the rule do not strictly enforce the requirement of the original.817  Indeed, 
copies of a writing are now freely admissible unless there is some reason to 
believe that the proponent of such has either acted in bad faith or that the 
offered substitute is not accurate. 
The rule usually is so easily satisfied that it does not generate many 
evidentiary issues.  However, during this Survey period, three cases arose 
that deserve brief discussion.818 
A. Videotape Evidence 
Two best evidence rule cases involve admission of videotape 
surveillance against an accused in a criminal case. 819   Photographs are 
broadly defined under the rule to include more than just still pictures.820  
Videotapes are explicitly included within this definition.821  When videotapes 
that actually capture a crime are introduced to show an accused’s guilt, there 
is no best evidence rule problem.822  Problems arise when the videos are not 
produced at trial, and the state still wants to benefit from them.823  The reason 
                                                 
813. See Burdeshaw v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 148 So. 3d 819, 823–27 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
814. FLA. STAT. § 90.952 (2014). 
815. T.D.W. v. State, 137 So. 3d 574, 575–76 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
816. See Yero v. State, 138 So. 3d 1179, 1184–85 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 
2014). 
817. See FLA. STAT. § 90.953. 
818. See infra Section VIII.A. 
819. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 575; Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1181. 
820. FLA. STAT. § 90.951(2).  Section 90.951 of the Florida Statutes defines 
photographs as including “still photographs, X-ray films, videotapes, and motion pictures.”  
Id. 
821. Id. 
822. See Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1184–85. 
823. See id. at 1185. 
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behind the videos’ absence can make all the difference in the world as 
illustrated by two recent cases.824 
In Yero v. State,825 the State charged the accused with theft of a 
woman’s wallet.826  The victim and her fiancée were at a bar late at night 
when they were approached by Yero who stood between them and spoke 
with them briefly.827  The wallet was sticking out of the victim’s purse, 
which was hung over a chair’s back.828  After speaking with them, Yero 
excused himself, went outside, came back and bought the couple drinks.829  
He then paid his own bar bill and left.830  Five minutes later, the victim 
noticed her wallet missing, and the sheriff’s office was called.831  A deputy 
arrived and learned the bar had surveillance cameras.832  The deputy and the 
two patrons watched the video.833  It showed Yero, at first, had no bulge in 
his pockets until after he stood between the couple.834  The bulge’s shape 
matched that of the missing wallet. 835   The video further showed Yero 
leaving the bar, coming back inside, no longer having the same bulge in any 
pocket.836 
All three testified at trial and described what they had seen on the 
video.837  The video itself was not shown as it had been overwritten by the 
bar’s security system.838  The deputy testified he had tried to get the video 
that night but was told it was unavailable.839  Nine days later, when the 
deputy returned to the bar, the tape was already overwritten.840  The system 
automatically recorded over any previous surveillance footage after five 
days, but no one ever told the deputy this.841  Thus, the tape was lost for use 
at trial.842   However, the trial court still allowed testimony about its contents 
                                                 
824. See id.; T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 575. 
825. 138 So. 3d 1179 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
826. Id. at 1181. 
827. Id. 
828. Id. 
829. Id. 
830. Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1181. 
831. Id. 
832. Id. 
833. Id. 
834. Id. at 1182. 
835. Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1182. 
836. Id. 
837. Id. at 1181–82. 
838. Id. at 1182. 
839. Id. 
840. Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1182. 
841. Id. 
842. Id. 
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after the State elicited proof about how it was unavailable.843  Yero appealed 
his conviction claiming the State had lost in bad faith the exculpatory 
evidence, violating both his Due Process rights and the Best Evidence 
Rule.844  As to his Due Process rights, the Third District found no bad faith 
on the State’s part and further found the tape would have been inculpatory, 
not exculpatory, in any event.845  On the best evidence claim, the district 
court noted that the rule statutorily provided for instances where originals 
were not required. 846   One instance is when “[a]ll originals are lost or 
destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith.”847  As 
the facts showed there was no bad faith, the witnesses’ testimony about the 
tape’s contents was permissible even in its absence.848 
What if a videotape is shown at trial, but the State elicits testimony 
about the contents of another tape that is not?  T.D.W. v. State849 presented 
that very scenario and led to a reversal.850  The State charged the defendant 
with being involved in a home burglary.851  A detective testified he was able 
to identify T.D.W. as one of the burglars from the angle shown on a 
surveillance video the detective viewed outside of trial.852  Even though other 
videotapes were shown at trial, the one showing the angle the detective 
referenced was not. 853   This proved to be crucial evidence against the 
defendant leading to his conviction.854 
On appeal, the Fourth District reversed. 855   The detective had 
testified the missing video clearly showed the accused’s face as one of the 
burglars.856  Unlike in Yero, the State never offered any explanation for the 
video view’s absence.857  Even though the State contended on appeal the tape 
                                                 
843. Id. 
844. Id. at 1182–84. 
845. Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1183. 
846. Id. at 1184–1185; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.954(1) (2014). 
847. FLA. STAT. § 90.954(1). 
848. Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1185.  Section 90.954 of the Florida Statutes lists three 
other instances when testimony about the contents of a missing writing does not violate the 
best evidence rule:  The original cannot be obtained by judicial process, the opposing party 
controls the original and is on notice it will be needed at hearing or trial, and the original is not 
material.  FLA. STAT. § 90.954(2)–(4). 
849. 137 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
850. Id. at 575, 578. 
851. Id. at 575. 
852. Id. 
853. Id. 
854. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 575. 
855. Id. at 575, 578. 
856. Id. at 576. 
857. Id. at 577; see also Yero v. State, 138 So. 3d 1179, 1182 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014). 
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was lost or destroyed, unlike in Yero, it never offered any proof at trial to 
back up this assertion.858  The State, as the proponent of the tape, had the 
burden to demonstrate the reason behind its absence, especially because its 
contents were clearly material. 859   Thus, it would be “unfair, under the 
circumstance, to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.”860  The Fourth 
District found that “when offered to prove [a] crime without introduction of 
the video in evidence, a witness’s in-court description of the actions depicted 
on the video is content-based testimony that violates the best evidence 
rule.”861 
B. Promissory Notes 
As mentioned, duplicates are usually admissible to the same extent 
as originals under the Best Evidence Rule.862  One exception to this general 
rule of free substitution is when there is a negotiable instrument or other 
special kind of commercial document.863  This includes promissory notes.864  
Alavi v. Garcia865 involving promissory notes, summary judgment hearings 
and the best evidence rule is a recent case of first impression.866 
The appellants had summary judgment entered against them in an 
action on a promissory note. 867   Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 
governs summary judgment proceedings in Florida.868   Subsection (c) of 
Rule 1.510 requires that any motion for summary judgment must be served 
                                                 
858. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 577; see also Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1182. 
859. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 577. 
860. FLA. STAT. § 90.953(3) (2014).  The court did not actually quote this 
subsection, but the gist of its opinion clearly reflects this language.  See T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 
577. 
861. Id. at 576. 
862. See FLA. STAT. § 90.953; T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 576–77. 
863. FLA. STAT. § 90.953(1).  Admissibility of duplicates, states in part that  
[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original, unless:  (1) the 
document or writing is a negotiable instrument, . . . a security, . . . or any other 
writing that evidences a right to the payment of money, is not itself a security 
agreement or lease, and is of a type that is transferred by delivery in the ordinary 
course of business with any necessary endorsement or assignment. 
Id.  The Federal Rules of Evidence do not have similar language and seem to have 
no special provisions about commercial documents under the best evidence rule.  See FED. R. 
EVID. 1003. 
864. See FLA. STAT. § 90.953(1). 
865. 140 So. 3d 1141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
866. Id. at 1142.  Although the court’s opinion does not label itself as one of 
first impression on the issue it decides, it does say “there appears to be no precedent directly 
on point.”  Id. 
867. Id. 
868. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510 (2014). 
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on the opposing party twenty days before the hearing date, and the motion 
must include copies of any evidence the movant relies upon.869   The motion 
must identify any “materials as would be admissible in evidence ‘summary 
judgment evidence’ on which the movant relies.”870  Subsection (e) furthers 
requires any affidavits “shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence.”871  It also requires that “[s]worn or certified copies of all papers or 
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
[therein].”872  When Garcia filed for summary judgment, he did not file the 
original of the promissory note twenty days before the hearing.873  Appellants 
argued this required reversal as the best evidence rule had been violated by 
the failure to do so.874 
The Fifth District declined to find the best evidence rule applicable 
to summary judgment hearings.875   The court found the rule “applies to 
proceedings wherein evidence is introduced” 876  but that evidence is not 
formally introduced in summary judgment hearings.877  The hearings are held 
to see if there are any material issues of fact meriting a trial.878  If not, the 
trial court simply renders judgment as a matter of law. 879   Under the 
summary judgment rule’s own language, the movant need only show proof 
that would be880 admissible later at trial.881  For a promissory note, at trial the 
note would have to be authenticated and the original produced at trial.882  
However, an affidavit setting forth facts supplying the authentication and 
attaching a copy of the original is all that is needed for summary judgment.883  
The court also declared that “[e]ven assuming that the best evidence rule 
applies in the summary judgment context, we hold that the presentation of 
the original note at or before the hearing satisfies [the] rule”,884 thus serving 
it on the opposing party twenty days before the hearing would not be 
                                                 
869. Id. 1.510(c). 
870. Id. 
871. Id. 1.510(e). 
872. Id. 
873. Alavi v. Garcia, 140 So. 3d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
874. Id. at 1143. 
875. Id. 
876. Id. 
877. See id. 
878. Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143. 
879. See id.; FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510 (2014). 
880. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510; Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143. 
881. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510; Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143. 
882. Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143. 
883. Id. 
884. Id.  The court noted the Fourth District had also found production of the 
original at the hearing sufficient to satisfy the rule.  Id.; see also Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. 
v. Clarke, 87 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
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needed.885  The court did note that surrender of the original note was needed 
before final judgment could be entered unless it was proven the note had 
been lost or destroyed.886 
Admittedly this case is as much about summary judgment as it is the 
best evidence rule.  However, it serves as a reminder that some proceedings 
require the originals of certain commercial documents if they are available. 
The court’s construction of the summary judgment rule’s wording as would 
be admissible also seems a very reasonable one.  If the rule had intended a 
different result, one would expect it to read, that is admissible at trial or in 
the same form that would be admissible at trial.  One would also not expect 
the words summary judgment evidence to have been used.  The use of these 
three words clearly indicates that there is a distinction between it and trial 
evidence.  Finally, the case serves as a reminder to counsel moving for 
summary judgment–bring the originals of documents to hearings in case the 
trial court decides they are mandatorily required there.887  As the saying goes, 
“better safe, than sorry.” 
IX. CONCLUSION
Overall, 2014 was probably a typical year for evidentiary 
developments. 888   Few statutory changes were made in the Code. 889  
Likewise, the courts decided few cases of first impression.890  This shows 
that after over thirty years, major issues under the Code have largely been 
resolved.  Now that this is so, attorneys and courts have to be careful in the 
judgment they use presenting and deciding evidentiary issues.  Unfortunately 
some of the cases discussed in this Survey could fall under the category of 
can you believe that ones.  Trial counsel and trial courts are on the front line 
as guardians of the Code, even though the appellate courts and Florida 
Legislature are its ultimate guardians.  All of us must take this responsibility 
seriously. 
885. Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143. 
886. Id. 
887. See id. at 1142–44. 
888. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
889. See supra Parts II–VII. 
890. See supra Parts II–VII. 
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